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Abstract 
This study inspects civil society participation in climate politics in India. It maps the role of civil society 
organizations (CSOs) in climate change issues in the country and analyzes their climate political positions. 
Climate change as a burning theme is deservedly the topic of lively academic discussion, increasingly also 
in social sciences. Given India’s status as a main emerging country and leadership role among developing 
countries in international environmental negotiations, its official climate political position is well studied. 
But the civil society angle on climate change in the world’s largest democracy remains uncharted ground. 
 
Therefore, this thesis embarks on exploratory research, undertaking the task of examining both the 
concrete climate change work done by Indian CSOs as well as the arguments they advance, based on 
fieldwork and in-depth interviews with 15 civil society actors. Previous studies have observed CSOs’ role 
as "norm entrepreneurs" that advocate for certain ideas and values in environmental politics, drawing on 
the potential of the “global civil society” for shaping a morally loaded world culture. Following this line 
of thought, the arguments brought forward by the interviewees are conceptualized as moral claims. 
Theoretical insight is provided by Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot. The research frame applies their 
justification theory and Thévenot’s sociology of engagements to the analysis of the interviews utilizing 
theory-bound content analysis. Thus, the thesis sets out to discover: 1. what do the CSOs do related to 
climate change, and 2. what are the main arguments they advance and how are these justified. 
 
The first result of this study is that CSOs in India are engaged mainly in five kinds of activities on climate 
change: awareness-raising, advocacy, research, mitigation and adaptation. While these action forms are 
not unique to the Indian context as such, they take special shapes in the country. The second main finding 
is an argumentative form named inspired justice environmentalism (IJE) prevailing among Indian CSOs 
working on climate change. The families of arguments that constitute IJE are: climate justice, democratic 
process, primacy of livelihoods, traditional human-nature relationship, and rejection of the climate change 
agenda. IJE evokes “civic”, “domestic” and “inspired” principles, and is juxtaposed to an “industrial” 
effective planning perspective.  
 
The study argues that sets of historically formed structural and cultural factors help explain the prevalence 
of IJE. Rampant poverty, vulnerability to climate change, low per capita emissions, and India’s position in 
the world system, as well as Gandhian, leftist and anticolonial thought and nature mysticism are connected 
to the discursive tendency. The results signal that arguments and their abstract and material justifications 
reflect both concrete circumstances and the political context, as well as an urgent sense of fairness. 
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Tiivistelmä  
Tämä pro gradu -tutkielma tarkastelee kansalaisyhteiskunnan osallistumista ilmastopolitiikkaan Intiassa. 
Se tutkii maan kansalaisjärjestöjen roolia ilmastonmuutoskysymyksissä ja analysoi niiden ilmasto-
poliittisia mielipiteitä. Ilmastonmuutos polttavana kysymyksenä on ansaitusti vilkkaan akateemisen 
keskustelun kohteena – hiljattain myös yhteiskuntatieteissä. Intian asema nousevana taloutena ja sen 
kansainvälisissä ympäristöneuvotteluissa omaksuma johtorooli kehitysmaiden keskuudessa on saanut 
tutkijat kiinnostumaan maan virallisesta ilmastopoliittisesta kannasta, mutta ilmastonmuutos kansalais-
yhteiskunnan näkökulmasta “maailman suurimmassa demokratiassa” on yhä tuntematon aihealue. 
 
Tämä tutkimus ottaa siis tehtäväkseen kartoittaa sekä Intian kansalaisjärjestökentän konkreettisesta 
ilmastonmuutostyötä että sen edistämiä argumentteja kenttätyön ja 15 järjestötoimijan haastattelun 
perusteella. Aiemmat tutkimukset ovat panneet merkille järjestöjen roolin “normiyrittäjinä”,  jotka ajavat 
ideoitaan ja arvojaan ilmastopolitiikassa hyödyntäen “globaalin kansalaisyhteiskunnan” kykyä muokata 
moraalisesti latautunutta mailmankulttuuria. Tätä ajatuskulkua seuraillen haastateltavien edistämiä 
näkemyksiä lähestytään moraalisina vaatimuksina. Teorian tutkimusasetelmaan tuovat Luc Boltanski ja 
Laurent Thévenot, joiden oikeuttamisteoriaa ja Thévenot’n sitoumusten sosiologiaa sovelletaan 
haastattelujen analyysiin teoriaohjautuvan sisällönanalyysin avulla. Tutkielman tavoitteena on siis 
selvittää: 1. mitä Intian kansalaisjärjestöt tekevät ilmastonmuutokseen liittyen, sekä 2. mitkä ovat niiden 
pääasiallisesti ajamat argumentit ja miten ne oikeutetaan. 
  
Tutkimuksen mukaan kansalaisjärjestöjen ilmastotoiminta koostuu viidestä toimintakentästä: tietoisuuden 
nostaminen, vaikuttamistyö, tutkimus, päästöjenhillitsemisstrategiat ja sopeutumisen tuki. Työn toinen 
päälöydös on Intian kansalaisjärjestökentällä yleinen argumentaatiotapa, jota kuvataan inspiroituneeksi 
oikeudenmukaisuusenvironmentalismiksi. Tämä koostuu seuraavista argumenttiperheistä: ilmasto-
oikeudenmukaisuus, demokraattinen päätöksenteko, elinkeinojen ensisijaisuus, perinteinen luontosuhde 
sekä ilmastonmuutosagendan hylkääminen. Oikeutuksissa vedotaan “kansalaisuuden”, ”kodin” ja 
”inspiraation” periaatteisiin, jotka asetetaan vastakkain ”teollisen” suunnitteludiskurssin kanssa.  
 
Tutkimus esittää, että vallitsevaa argumentaatiotapaa selittävät historiallisesti muodostuneet rakenteelliset 
ja kultturiset tekijät: köyhyys,  alttius ilmastonmuutoksejalle,  matalat hiilidioksidipäästöt henkeä kohti ja   
Intian asema kansainvälisessä järjestelmässä, sekä gandhilainen, vasemmistolainen ja antikolonialistinen 
ajattelu ja luontomystisismi. Tulokset viestittävät, että argumentit abstrakteine ja  materiaalisine 
oikeutuksineen heijastavat sekä konkreettista ja politiittista kontekstia että oikeudenmukaisuuskäsityksiä. 
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 1 Introduction 
Climate change is arguably the most pressing environmental, social and political 
problem of our time. Climate change refers to the anthropogenic changes occurring in 
the climate on a global scale (IPCC 2007). But climate change is not only a natural 
scientific issue; it is also a social question. The social dimensions of climate change, 
which are easily neglected, are increasingly being recognized and also adopted as the 
research object of a growing number of studies within social sciences. Sociologists have 
had an interest in environmental issues since the 1960s (Dunlap & Catton 1979), and 
recently the field has witnessed efforts to introduce sociological insight into the study of 
climate change and “place the social at the heart of the climate change discussion” (Urry 
2011). The transformations manifesting in the atmosphere bring about not only 
ecological, but also societal change; the symbol of climate change is a drowning polar 
bear, but the image might as well be the affected farmer or the forced migrant (Brand et 
al. 2009, 7). The importance of social systems in analyzing climate change also 
becomes evident when we realize that it is precisely the human-induced high-carbon 
systems that have to transform if the planet and humanity are to survive (Urry 2011). 
Accordingly, for many countries climate change is as much a developmental challenge 
as it is an environmental problem, with adverse implications for poverty reduction 
attempts and aspirations of growth. The already manifesting effects of climate change 
endanger livelihoods and tend to perpetuate existing vulnerability. (Mearns & Norton 
2011.) This imbalance adds to the fact that climate change is a highly contested issue – 
even leaving aside the discordant notes on whether the phenomenon exists. Its 
problematics, which on the surface appear to be merely technical questions, are in fact 
deeply political (Brand et al. 2009; Urry 2011). How to combat it, how to come to a 
conclusion, who should do what – in an interrelated world, there is a need to negotiate 
an agreement because in the end, climate change affects all countries and their people. 
Despite this global reach, climate change can be considered inherently inequitable due 
to disparities in cause and effect. Therefore, it inevitably raises ethical concerns (Barker 
et al. 2008, 317). As a matter centering on both nature and humans, it forms a tangle of 
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complex morally loaded questions. These questions form the central content of global 
and national climate politics.  
This thesis studies climate politics in India from a civil society perspective. Climate 
change is possibly the most globally connecting issue for current civil society advocacy 
the world over. The study starts from the premise of climate change as a political and 
moral issue and seeks to provide sociological insight on the norms and values which are 
at the center of the climate change debate. In concrete, it maps civil society 
organizations’ (CSOs’) engagement in climate politics, policy-making, and public 
climate debate as well as grassroots efforts in the country, and analyzes the arguments 
brought forward by civil society actors as moral claims. The analysis is based on 
interviews with a diverse collection of Indian CSO actors, including all the main players 
in the field. 
India provides an especially interesting setting for studying climate politics for several 
reasons. First, the challenges of combining domestic developmental goals (poverty 
reduction efforts and the continuing imperative of growth) with pressing local and 
global environmental exigency make environmental politics a highly contested and 
morally loaded field of action. Furthermore, the rising significance of the country, both 
because of its sheer size and increasing power as an emerging economy, as well as its 
influential leading role in the developing world, makes it a key actor in global climate 
governance (Billet 2010, 1; Dubash 2012a, 2; Rajan 1997, 5; Vihma 2011, 69). India 
can also be considered a good representative of “the South”, as on the international 
arena the country often reflects and articulates developing countries’ concerns and 
shared challenges, such as the relationship between developmental aspirations and 
environmental concerns (Huikuri 2011; Rajan 1997, 5; Sengupta 2012, 104; Vihma 
2011, 70). Lastly, along with China, India is often appointed the role of a tough nut in 
global climate negotiations (e.g. Vihma 2011, 74), which raises questions about the 
standpoint of India’s civil society and the normative stand it takes between traditional 
national positions and the environmentalist currents of the “global civil society”. While 
India has for long held a resistant position in global climate negotiations, transnational 
civil society coalitions have notably stood in support of strict climate policies. 
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International efforts to come up with a multilateral agreement on measures to halt 
climate change have risen a great deal of critique from India and other developing 
countries. One major point of critique is that the proposed solutions and actions do not 
sufficiently reflect the differing historical responsibility among countries for the 
anthropogenic reasons of climate change. Historically, rich countries have contributed 
more to the global greenhouse gas emissions stock, but India’s people are one of the 
first sufferers of the convulsion that the accumulation of these gases in the atmosphere 
is causing (Watkins 2007). On the other hand, it is clear that India’s share of global 
emissions is quickly rising (Malik 2013). The most complex of challenges is to find an 
outcome that could be found just by all parties. This is precisely where the problem, 
often portrayed as technical in nature, becomes also moral. What should the debate and 
underlying questions of right and wrong actually be about? Should they center on 
ecology, equity, efficiency or perhaps a due democratic policy-making process?  
The mounting challenges of climate change have evoked action and heated debates 
within all sectors of society, as well as local, national and international levels of 
governance. While climate politics are usually interpreted through state and interstate 
action, the focus here is on civil society participation. I will concentrate on this integral 
aspect of climate politics, often ignored in research: the role that civil society can play 
as a site of contestation and solution-seeking for the looming crisis facing humanity, in 
pressing for action and, arguably, in bringing forward moral takes to the discussion 
table. India counts with a vibrant civil society embedded in the country’s long-standing 
democratic tradition (Sen 2007[2005]; Tenhunen & Säävälä 2007, 235). The climate 
change work performed within this field merits academic insight, as many Indian civil 
society organizations have recently increasingly adopted climate change onto their 
agenda (Lele 2012, 208). Climate change related civil society activity is a novel 
phenomenon in India, and the topic is as of yet virtually undocumented through 
scientific enquiry. The study at hand seeks to alleviate this shortage by providing new, 
systematic knowledge on this important field.  
Previous research has illuminated how groups of climate change activists over the world 
have mobilized to contest the excesses of “carbon capitalism”, with varying levels of 
organization and types of action ranging from local demonstrations to international 
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campaigns and global summits (Urry 2011, 92). It has been observed that civil society 
participation has become an integral part of global climate governance efforts (Hjerpe & 
Linnér 2010; Gulbrandsen & Andresen 2004; Lisowski 2005). Civil society 
involvement has been found to bring democratic accountability to politics of climate 
change (Newell 2008, 149), help address representation gaps by strengthening 
participation of affected countries and communities (Dombrowski 2010, 402–403), 
increase legitimacy through grassroots input (Hjerpe & Linnér 2010), enhance the 
transparency of the intergovernmental process and “help optimize the international 
response” to climate change (Lisowski 2005, 361), as well as contribute with the 
abundance of ideas and alternatives (Unmüssig 2011, 10) stemming from it. CSOs are 
often praised for their ability to act as links between the local and global level, 
communicating concerns from the grassroots up to decision-making fora. These 
representative capacities are of course contested and far from perfect, especially 
concerning marginalized communities. The involvement of instances pertaining to the 
broad space called “civil society” by no means automatically increases democratic 
accountability or participatory policy-making. Also, civil society participation does not 
automatically mean empowerment (Tandon & Mohanty 2003). Civil society holds 
liberating and democratic as well as opposing potential within its spectrum (Jayal 2001, 
125; Oommen 2004, 111). Accountability issues feature their own particularities in the 
case of the democratic, but deeply segregated society which is India.  
Along with representative capacities, many studies examine CSO influence or map the 
effectiveness of climate campaigning on negotiations and policy-making (e.g. Corell & 
Betsill 2001; Gulbrandsen & Andresen 2004; Hall & Taplin 2007). By emphasizing 
their position as representatives of the “public interest”, CSOs can adopt a no-
compromise approach to environmental policy-making and legitimately question the 
credibility of compromise proposals (Lisowski 2005, 372, 378). As we will see, actors 
regularly employ their capacity to justify claims and denounce others’ assertions with 
references to some shared understanding of the “common good” (Boltanski & Thévenot 
2006[1991]). 
Boli and Thomas (1997) have observed the way non-governmental organizations in 
their international operations engage in shaping a morally loaded “world culture”. 
5 
 
Currently climate change, being by definition a global issue, provides an ideal setting 
for debates on and diffusion of values, such as environmentalism. Constructivist 
approaches have developed an apposite view of civil society actors as “norm 
entrepreneurs” (e.g. Parks & Roberts 2010) that actively shape the international “moral 
temper” (Okereke 2008). For instance, the incorporation of justice issues into climate 
negotiations has been pressed for by concerned civil society groups. This study sets out 
to concentrate on this aspect of civil society action: the moral dimension of civil society 
engagement in climate politics. As mentioned, ethical questions become specifically 
evident in India’s case. Moreover, climate change related work carried out by civil 
society in India has so far not been rigorously studied, and thus calls for a more general 
account on their operations and agendas as well. 
Hence, the purpose of this study is to find out what is the role of civil society in India’s 
climate politics. The specific research questions are:  
1. How do civil society organizations participate in climate politics in India? What 
is their repertoire of action on climate change?  
2. What are the main arguments different civil society actors advance regarding 
climate change? How do they justify these climate political positions? What 
kind of higher moral principles and understanding of common good do the 
arguments invoke? 
The objective of the thesis is thus to form a comprehensive picture of civil society’s 
climate change work in India informed by previous domestic and international research, 
theoretical literature, and the acquired interview material. While doing so, it contributes 
to a view of civil society actors’ moral entrepreneurship by applying pragmatist theory 
on acts of “justification” (Boltanski & Thévenot 2006[1991]), towards an understanding 
of values in action. This allows for analyzing the way speakers justify certain actions 
and arguments as legitimate while questioning the validity of other logics.  
The study proceeds from an introduction to climate governance efforts, national and 
international climate politics, and civil society’s role in these, to a contextualization to 
the case of India. These are presented in chapter 2 through earlier research. Chapter 3 
explains what exactly I have studied and how, giving an account of my theoretical 
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starting point, central concepts, data, and methods. The analysis chapters that follow 
discuss civil society’s role in climate politics and its engagement in the climate change 
debate in India: first, through a descriptive chapter giving an account of the repertoire of 
action, and then, by analyzing morally loaded arguments that civil society 
representatives present related to their climate political position. Chapter 4 explains in 
detail the Indian CSOs’ activities on climate change: awareness raising, policy 
advocacy, research activities, mitigation strategies and adaptation support. Chapter 5 
discusses the most prevalent arguments they advance, namely demands for climate 
justice, calls for a democratic policy-making process, primacy of protecting livelihoods, 
referrals to a traditional human-nature relationship, rejection of the climate change 
agenda, and finally, emphasis on effective planning. The main justifications build a 
picture of a distinctive argumentative form I call inspired justice environmentalism, 
which is often juxtaposed to the climate-scientific planning perspective. Chapter 6 
provides a round-up of results accompanied by thorough discussion and general 
conclusions.  
I have had the chance to seek guidance and insight on the Indian context, political 
culture and environmental politics during my fieldwork in India at the ABV-IIITM 
Institute in Gwalior, as well as at the Nordic Institute of Asian Studies in Copenhagen, 
both of which I am indebted to for enabling an extensive review of relevant literature. 
Academic discussion on the context is displayed briefly in the background section and 
expanded on in conjunction with the analysis. The thesis was prepared in affiliation 
with the Helsinki Research Group for Political Sociology (HEPO) comparative research 
project on climate change and civil society (CLIC), which has been a source of 
inspiration and influenced my theoretical framework.  
2 Background: Climate change, civil society and India 
This chapter elaborates the background for my research. It gives an overview of global 
climate politics, the international negotiation process, and CSOs’ participation in it. The 
chapter also provides a concise thematic introduction to national climate politics in 
India and includes a preliminary look at civil society in the country, particularly the 
environmental movements that have manifested during the last decades. 
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2.1 Global climate governance and the grassroots 
The international climate negotiation process is by far the most visible arena for climate 
politics, which is why I will begin by explaining this complex process and CSOs’ 
participation in it. International environmental negotiations stand out among the many 
current multilateral negotiation processes due to the “particularly constructive 
relationship between negotiators and non-governmental organizations” that has been 
attributed to them (Lisowski 2005, 361). Non-state actors participate in negotiations 
with the intention of influencing national and international climate policy, both directly 
and through affecting countries’ stances.  
Starting from the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (UNCHE
1
) 
held in Stockholm in 1972, which laid the ground for multilateral collaboration on 
environmental issues, civil society involvement has grown to become an integral part of 
the UN negotiating process (Hjerpe & Linnér 2010). Inter-state negotiations on 
addressing climate change culminated with the inception of the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Rio de Janeiro at the 1992 
UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), or the so-called Earth 
Summit. The goal of the convention, which became the basis of subsequent 
internationally coordinated action to halt climate change, was the “stabilization of 
greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent 
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system” (United Nations 1992, 
article 2).  
Stockholm already witnessed record levels of civil society participation in multilateral 
negotiations, with around ten thousand observer organizations present (Lisowski 2005, 
362). Since then, CSO involvement in international environmental negotiations has 
continued to grow rapidly (Carpenter 2001, 319; Gulbrandsen & Andresen 2004, 54), 
up until circa 1600 admitted non-governmental observer organizations and a myriad of 
unofficial civil society participants present in the latest 2013 Conference of Parties 
(COP 19) in Warsaw – 19th in the series of the COPs that have been held by the parties 
                                                 
1
 A complete list of abbreviations appearing in this thesis can be found in appendix 1.  
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of the Framework Convention since the mid-1990s to negotiate the details of how 
exactly emission reductions could and should be achieved.
2
 
Tremendous growth has occurred not only in the number of CSO participants, but also 
in their range of action and the assemblage of political perspectives they represent. 
While the first civil society representatives interested in climate change included mainly 
groups concerned with environmental issues, nowadays CSOs involved in climate 
politics plead for a diverse collection of causes. This makes the civil society branch a far 
from a unified front, with a single agenda much harder to agree on than early on. 
Geographical provenance has diversified, too. Initially, civil society representatives 
active in the international arena came primarily from Northern countries, but later on, 
groups from developing countries have established their presence as well. (Carpenter 
2001, 320–321.) The traditional environmental organizations have been accompanied 
by development organizations invested in climate politics. Although I, too, refer to the 
notion of a “global civil society” as an actor in climate politics, it is clear that such an 
imagined, loose transnational community is defined by divides and differences as much 
as by similarities. 
In negotiations, civil society actors make formal interventions to sessions, have informal 
group meetings, discuss with national delegations, interplay with the media to increase 
media coverage on climate change, raise public awareness, and feed into the 
negotiations themselves, and organize and attend an ever growing amount of official 
and unofficial side-events (Carpenter 2001, 319). Indeed, side-events are the most 
visible form of civil society participation in international climate negotiations. They 
provide a place to make contacts and a process for creating a shared vision and 
conceptual basis among the wide range of actors. Moreover, they act as venues for 
information dissemination and provide an opportunity for institutional capacity 
building, especially so for less experienced Southern organizations. On the other hand, 
they might exacerbate the threat of favoring the hegemony of Northern CSOs, who 
generally speaking tend to be more experienced as well as confident in pushing through 
their views. (Hjerpe & Linnér 2010.) Apart from independent participation, some 
                                                 
2
 Figures from www.unfccc.int. 
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countries, including India, have invited CSO representatives to participate in the climate 
change negotiations as members of their official delegations (interviews; Lisowski 
2005, 365).  
It seems that diplomatic responses have overwhelmingly failed to keep up with the pace 
of accelerating climate change. Brand et al. (2009, 10) laconically note how, “with all 
the attention, all the drama, not much has changed in the last 20 years, at least not for 
the better”. COPs have often resulted in bitter disappointments for civil society 
campaigners. Especially COP 15 in Copenhagen 2009 was a tremendous let-down. 
Despite high expectations – and pressure by the “climate movement” – heads of state 
failed to come up with a legally binding international instrument to halt climate change 
(e.g. Dubash & Rajamani 2010). As per their classical “watchdog” role (Tocqueville 
2004[1835–40]), civil society campaigners have maintained pressure for action and 
keeping of promises, and critiqued states’ commitment and performance, and some of 
the institutionalized international responses. Especially prone to critique have been the 
so-called flexible mechanisms, such emissions trading programs, under which countries 
buy and sell carbon credits among themselves, and the Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM), which allows developed countries to receive emission credits by sponsoring 
emission reduction projects in developing countries (interviews; Lele 2012, 210–211).  
Although many writers enlarge upon the positive side of CSOs taking part in climate 
politics, civil society participation should not be seen in exclusively rosy light. While I 
take the stand that enhanced inclusiveness is valuable as such, CSO involvement is no 
guarantee of some wider participatory quality of the policy-making process. Increased 
engagement of civil society in the international climate policy-making process has 
raised not only appraisal, but also apprehension. Some fear that as CSOs turn into 
policy-makers themselves, they are potentially in danger of becoming “too engaged, too 
divorced from their claimed-for constituency and too much associated with the 
corresponding outcomes of negotiations and policies” (Gough & Shackley 2001, 329). 
Some scholars even go so far as to maintain that civil society should not participate and 
thus legitimize a negotiation process, which they see as fundamentally flawed (Brand et 
al. 2009, 13). This concern is related to the point that even barely nominal incorporation 
of a number of civil society groups in a given process seems to add immediate 
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legitimacy to it, irrespective of their actually being representative of some larger public 
or bearing any common interest in mind.  
Other questions can be posed in relation to the types, operating levels and goals of 
organizations. Not all CSOs in fact seek to be agents of “the people”, while some are 
better equipped to do so than others. Further functions exist besides the representation 
edge. This case study points to activities such as providing concrete solutions to the 
grassroots, or much needed insight into environmental issues that governments with less 
capacity in this respect might lack. These themes are reviewed again alongside the 
results of this study. Indeed, there are many more ways civil society groups can work 
with climate change, as we will see in chapter 4. Now, I will go on to present some of 
the concerns and controversies that climate change has invoked in India. 
2.2 Climate politics in India 
 “Asymmetries of cause and effect in climate change directly reflect global 
 development divides, making the question of how to address climate 
 change unalterably a question of justice.” (Goodman 2009, 501.) 
There is a certain tension related to international climate negotiations in India and other 
developing countries. The ambivalent attitude can be derived from the fact that 
historically, developing countries have contributed less to the reasons of climate change 
but now bare a heavier load of its risks (Watkins 2007). The developing world can be 
thus seen as the first sufferer of a disaster primarily caused by rich countries. In addition 
to being generally highly more vulnerable to the effects of climate change, developing 
countries count with significantly less resources for climate change adaptation and 
mitigation (Watkins 2007, 8–10). The idea of climate justice (discussed in more detail 
in section 5.1) derives precisely from this contradiction.  
An essential part of the climate change discussion in India is its relation to development 
efforts. This has to do with the profound paradox regarding environmental issues in 
India: the country continuingly dreams of economic growth, but uncontrolled growth 
adds to pollution. In developing countries, the overwhelming need to halt climate 
change has raised concern that climate policies should not jeopardize development 
(Barker et al. 2008, 318). In India this has translated into outright anxiety about India’s 
“need and right to develop”: many feel that first and foremost, the continuing need to 
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grow should be addressed, and the challenge of climate change should not slow down 
progress in eradicating poverty (Parikh & Parikh 2011, 209–210).  
India has gradually moved from the status of an “underdeveloped” to an emerging 
country, all the while still obviously dealing with momentous development issues. India 
is the world’s largest democratic market economy, but also has the world’s largest 
concentration of people living in extreme poverty. Parallel to India’s progressive 
prospering, the so-called developed countries have acknowledged the “limits of growth” 
(Meadows et al. 1972) and come to realize that the mode of development they have 
gone through is unsustainable, This has called for re-thinking of the current paradigm of 
“development” – a reformulation process in which developing countries have adopted 
an unprecedingly prominent role. (Khoday & Natarajan 2012, 424, 430.) As Dubash 
(2012a, xxiii) put it, “the most exciting and creative part of the Indian climate debate are 
the efforts to re-envision the challenge of climate change within the larger objective of 
sustainable and inclusive development”. These efforts strive towards a vision of 
sustainable development, which could link efforts to lift people out of poverty with the 
fight against climate change; a model where both poverty and emissions could be 
reduced. The discussion on sustainable development encompasses the constant presence 
of tensions between valuing nature, growth and social well-being. At the appearance of 
disagreement, confusion arises on the relative worth of the different pillars of the 
sustainable development triangle. Justification theory, introduced in the next chapter, 
can help assess this contention and offers fertile ground for analyzing processes of 
combining environmental, economic and social goals that spur from qualitatively 
different ethical premises. 
Considering the above, it becomes clear that for India, climate change is a highly 
controversial theme – although generally accepted as scientific reality: there is hardly 
any public debate on denial of global changes in the climate (Billet 2010, 5). Indeed, 
effects of atmospheric change are manifesting already on the subcontinent (Dash 2007; 
Dash 2010; Government of India 2012; Hasnain & Tayal 2010; Srinivasan 2012). Billet 
(2010, 15) observes that in the place of politicization of climate change as an existing 
phenomenon, there is intensive politicization of global climate policy, as climate 
politics on an international scale are often viewed through a postcolonial frame. He 
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turns the table on Said’s (2003[1978]) orientalism by suggesting that India sees the 
responsibility to tackle climate change as lying with the “other” (ibid., 3–4). 
From early on, India has held a leading role in formulating a common stance for 
developing countries on climate change, and has forcefully pushed through the 
perspective of the developing world in the international arena (Jakobsen 1998; Rajan 
1997). The general position of developing countries in international negotiations has 
focused on justice issues (Barker et al. 2008, 318). India has been one of the most vocal 
countries in arguing that the climate problem, as one caused by the North, should be 
dealt with by the North, and has often reminded Northern countries on their obligation 
to help finance mitigation and adaptation activities in the developing world (Billet 2010, 
3; Vihma 2011, 74–75). India has also strictly refused to make commitments to limit its 
emissions on the account that developing countries’ mitigation commitments would 
only “keep poor countries poor” (Vihma 2011, 75). 
The traditional position of the Indian government on climate change is constituted of the 
positioning of historic responsibility along North–South lines, and demands for “per 
capita” rights to global environmental resources (Vihma 2011, 78). The latter claim 
asserts that India as a large country, which is the home to almost a fifth of the world’s 
population, should be entitled to its “fair share” of global greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions. The GHGs produced in India remain under 5 percent of global emissions. 
This makes an Indian citizen’s carbon footprint less than one-tenth of that of an average 
person in high-income countries. (Watkins 2007, 43, 69.) Human-originated carbon 
dioxide emissions in India only count 1.5 tonnes per capita, compared to 10.6 tonnes for 
Finland or for instance 18.0 tonnes for the USA and 5.3 tonnes for China. This posits 
India in 136
th
 place in a comparison of 186 countries. (World Bank 2012.) Furthermore, 
regarding the total cumulative emissions over time that drive today’s climate change, 
India is responsible for just over 2 percent of hitherto GHG stocks (Watkins 2007, 40).  
Figures like this explain developing countries’ resentment to mitigation requirements 
and the widespread feeling that their development is being “constrained” by emission 
reduction requirements brought about by climate change. India resents having to cut 
down its emissions, which are still very modest considering the population size. 
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Nonetheless, it is a fact that the country’s total emissions are on the rise, as emerging 
India faces rapid development prospects. Regarding total current flows, India as a whole 
counts as one of the world’s major GHG producers, and is now the fourth largest 
emitter globally (Watkins 2007, 42). But a considerable gap exists between the emission 
contributions of the rich and the poor of the country. India’s progress in spreading 
human development is significantly “less impressive than its growth performance” 
(Malik 2013, 64). Despite the growing consuming class, the country’s emissions are 
kept relatively low by the massive poverty that the bulk of Indians still face: thirty 
percent of the population live in extreme poverty and over 500 million Indians get by 
without access to electricity (Malik 2013, 161; Watkins 2007, 44).  
The objectives of India’s foreign environmental policy have for long been sovereignty, 
equity and the importance of economic development (Rajan 1997, 37, 104, 255). Along 
with allowing for development, its goal in climate negotiations has involved ensuring 
energy security, as access to energy is seen as vital to building a modern society. 
Accelerating growth to address development and poverty-alleviation goals is commonly 
seen as primary to climate-related goals. This implies permitting emissions to rise 
before a transition to a carbon-neutral economy. (Gupta et al. 2011, 183.) Traditionally, 
there is a tendency to contrasting environmental and developmental goals (Vihma 2011, 
74); most prominently so since Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s famous speech in 
Stockholm at the 1972 UNCHE, where she highlighted that while facing the dilemma of 
not wanting to impoverish the environment, the overriding concern for India lies with 
the deep poverty and suffering of masses of its citizens. The speech employed 
postcolonial rhetoric and articulated the now generalized historical position which 
emphasizes that rich countries have reached their current level of development through 
previous exploitation of nature. (Gandhi 1972.) 
India’s negotiating position builds upon the claim for common but differentiated 
responsibilities (CBDR). Since the inception of multilateral negotiations, there has been 
a “strong North–South axis” in climate politics (Dubash & Rajamani 2010, 598). The 
UNFCCC, signed in 1992, is also rooted in this context, and includes repeated 
references to the differing circumstances and responsibilities of developed and 
developing countries. The convention affirmed the notion of common but differentiated 
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responsibilities. The convention declares that those countries historically primarily 
responsible for climate change would have to reduce their emissions first and more 
drastically, as well as provide resources to developing countries to help limit emissions. 
The world’s most developed countries, listed in Annex 1, should “take the lead” in 
fighting climate change, while Non-Annex 1 Parties – the rest – were outside binding 
targets. (United Nations 1992.) India played a crucial part in the insertion of such 
statements (Jakobsen 1998, 1–2). The fact that emission-reduction objectives set in the 
convention were not reached gives reason for allegations that developing countries have 
failed to take the lead as promised, and “asking the developing world, including India, 
to make up for this delay would be deeply unfair” (Dubash 2009, 2–3). The CBDR 
concept is open to multiple interpretations; India recognizes it as meaning a strict 
division of responsibilities along Annex 1 and Non-Annex 1 lines and continues to 
demand the principle’s fulfillment (Vihma 2011, 77). Many Northern countries in turn 
dismiss referrals to it as outdated and regressive. 
The above described climate political positioning has earned India the role of a 
“difficult partner” in international climate negotiations (Vihma 2011, 74). But the 
anticolonial reading of the situation, and skepticism towards rich countries’ agenda, is 
not simply made up out of whole cloth; nor does this negotiation strategy rest solely on 
power politics, as a realist outlook would suggest. It must be noted that instead of being 
only cultural constructions, developing countries’ resentment to limitations on their 
“ability to develop” are based on concrete historical and current global inequality. They 
can thus hardly be blamed for their “view of climate change in historical and 
developmental terms” (cf. Billet 2010, 10). Parks and Roberts (2010) point out that 
there are sensible structural reasons for this resentment, which can only be removed by 
connecting climate negotiation with a broader idea of global justice.  
Parks and Roberts (ibid., 135) suggest that the North and the South have not managed to 
come to an agreement on climate change for a great part because they have not been 
able to find a common “focal point” on fairness. What the authors call “principled 
beliefs” have the potential to facilitate cooperation – provided that they are widely 
shared. But due to global inequality, these beliefs differ substantively between 
countries. In our “morally ambiguous world”, understandings of fairness depend on the 
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position of a country within the global hierarchy. The perception of persistent 
international inequality affects how developing country actors view the issue of climate 
change, and impedes reaching an agreement. Thus, the writers argue that climate 
negotiations should be broadened to include not only technicalities but also a range of 
seemingly unrelated development issues, which affluent states often consider irrelevant 
and distracting. (Ibid., 146–148.) With the emergence of BASIC countries3  as a block 
in climate negotiations, it has become imperative to acknowledge Southern claims and 
revise “much of the developed world’s hitherto largely dismissive stance towards equity 
considerations as politically unrealistic” (Dubash & Rajamani 2010, 594, 598). Parks 
and Roberts (2010, 141–144) recount how dematerializing rich economies can be 
afforded partly at the expense of shifting ecological burdens to the South. Thereby, 
“Southern worldviews and causal beliefs cannot be dismissed as a false construct or 
erroneous mental model, used to justify poor performance […] by almost any measure, 
ecologically unequal exchange in not just a perception; it is a social reality” (ibid., 139).  
Justification theory can help in understanding the distinctive difficulties that the 
international discussion on climate change has encountered. Opposing positions on 
environmental politics might depart from entirely different premises, but both form no 
less morally justified takes. Sometimes parties find themselves speaking in different 
“registers”, while the ethical groundings of each can be equally sustained, but rather 
incompatible. It is the clash of principles that makes the potential conflicts so intense. 
These points will be further elaborated in the course of the empirical part of the study. 
2.3 Indian civil society and environmental movement 
India as “the world’s largest democracy” has often been considered somewhat of a 
miracle, taken its multi-ethnic, multi-religious, and multi-linguistic composition (Swain 
1997, 818). Largely due to its established democratic tradition, India counts with a 
lively and freely operating civil society (Tenhunen & Säävälä 2007, 235).  
Civil society is a wide concept, with no simple theoretical consensus existing on its 
definition. Often, it is considered the “third” force of society, the others being the state 
and the economy (e.g Cohen & Arato 1992, ix). Following this analytical division, 
                                                 
3
 Group of large newly industrialized countries: Brazil, South-Africa, India and China. 
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actors in the arena of climate politics include governments and official policy makers 
(public sector), businesses and corporate actors (private sector), and non-governmental 
organizations, advocacy groups, activists, non-profit think tanks, et cetera (civil 
society). Many Indian sociologists make the point that the common theoretical 
formulation of civil society, as one based on Western experience, should not be 
recklessly replicated; Indian “civil society” must be understood in an Indian context 
(e.g. Oommen 2004; Parekh 2006, 455; Tandon & Mohanty 2003). While these 
limitations should be kept in mind, the purpose of this study is not to formulate a theory 
of Indian civil society but rather adopt a practical understanding for empirical research 
purposes. Accordingly, the conceptualization used here is fairly straightforward: I 
generally talk about organized civil society, represented by CSOs. With these I mean 
non-profit organizations not formally bound by business or governmental interests, but 
which might nonetheless engage with them in their advocacy work.
4
  
The currently budding civil society participation in climate politics in India can build on 
a long line of environmental movements. Starting from the 1970s, grassroots 
environmental movements have been expanding in India (Karan 1994, 32). 
Environmental action groups have for example sought to combat deforestation, resist 
commercial logging and large hydroelectric projects and advocate ecological principles 
of water use (Karan 1994, 33; Swain 1997). By far the best-known environmental 
initiative in India is the Chipko (Hug the Trees) movement that emerged in 1973 among 
the hill people in the northern state of Uttar Pradesh (Brara 2003, 143; Guha 1989 in 
Swain 1997 and in Gadgil & Guha 1995; Jayal 2001, 137).  
Indian environmental movements differ from their Western counterparts in being more 
concerned with issues of equity and social justice as well as environmental preservation 
(Karan 1994, 32–33). They are not “post-materialist movements” (e.g. Della Porta & 
Diani 2006, 68–69) like environmental movements have often been conceptualized in 
the West; their central concern is “more basic: life itself” (Jayal 2001, 140). Jayal (ibid., 
139) describes how in India, “the movements frequently described as environmental 
                                                 
4
 To be specific, this includes both national and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs and 
INGOs), environmental NGOs (ENGOs) and non-governmental development organizations (NGDOs) 
development beign the sector with most civil society activity in India (Jayal 2001, 134). As a distinction 
indicated by the CSO conceptualization, business and industry NGOs (so called BINGOs) are excluded. 
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movements […] do not always have environmentalism as their core concern”, but rather 
are often essentially “struggles by peasant and tribal communities for their survival and 
livelihood”. These types of concerns seem to also be reflected in the aspects of climate 
change that many parts of the civil society in India bring forth. 
Gadgil and Guha (1994, 119–120) distinguish between three aspects in analyzing the 
Indian environmental movement: its material, political and ideological expressions. The 
material context is most distinctively constituted by struggles over natural resources. 
The political expression of Indian environmentalism has been organizing to fight 
environmental degradation, which has often occurred in the form of mobilization of its 
“victims”. Finally, the ideological expression is constituted by the public debate, which 
has centered on trying to outline an alternate framework for development that would be 
both ecologically sustainable and socially just.  
Indeed, the bulk of environmental movements in India revolve around competing claims 
over renewable natural resources or manifest the struggle for the rights of victims of 
discriminatory or destructive undertakings and environmental destruction (Swain 1997, 
819). This is because the development model of emerging economies has been largely 
based on increased demand on such resources (Khoday & Natarajan 2012, 417). Thus, 
the origins of these conflicts lie in the process of development itself (Gadgil and Guha 
1994, 119–120). They can be considered an expression of the adverse socio-ecological 
effects of narrowly conceived development goals; resource-intensive demands of 
development have often been counter-productive, resulting in ecological destruction and 
economic deprivation (Karan 1994, 32–33). There has been growing popular opposition 
against some of the developmental policies adopted by the state, and people have risen 
up resist a development model that they feel excludes them. Environmental protests in 
India now pose a serious challenge to the dominant ideology of development-as-growth. 
(Swain 1997, 819, 828.) Such processes of contestation may give grounds for hopes 
affirming that ecological and developmental aspirations can perhaps be combined, 
provided that a reformulation of “development” is allowed to take place.  
While there is widespread agreement among diverse environmentalist actors on the 
failure of the imposed development model, there is less consensus on an alternative. 
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Divergent ideologies co-exist within the spectrum of Indian environmental movements. 
(Gadgil & Guha 1995, 107.) Environmental activist groups differ from one another in 
their demands, courses of action and perceptions of development, and are not guided by 
one overarching philosophy (Swain 1997, 828).  
Gadgil and Guha (1995, 107–112) go on further to identify three ideological strands in 
Indian environmentalism: Crusading Gandhian environmentalists, Ecological Marxists, 
and environmentalism centered on Appropriate Technology. Crusading Gandhians take 
a nearly religious stand in rejecting the modern way of life, and view the traditional 
village community as the protector of environmental and social harmony. 
Environmental degradation is perceived above all as a moral problem, its origins lying 
in the wider acceptance of the ideology of materialism and consumerism that draws 
humans away from nature. Ecological Marxists draw from leftist thought in their 
approach, maintaining that it is unequal access to resources that explains the processes 
of environmental degradation: in a sharply stratified society, the rich destroy in pursuit 
of profit and the poor in order to survive. They envision the redistribution of economic 
and political power as their ultimate goal, as the creation of an economically just society 
is seen as a precondition of both social and ecological harmony. Appropriate 
Technology looks to practical socio-technical alternatives to environmentally degrading 
technologies: suitable combinations of modern and traditional technology that combine 
agriculture and industry. It pursues economic and political equity and is influenced by 
Western socialism. These strands of Indian environmentalism reflect typical 
interpretative frameworks found in modern Indian political culture, and their 
relationship to current climate change thinking will be discussed after having reviewed 
the prevalent arguments of CSOs on the issue. 
Growing numbers of new social movements have shaken Indian democracy since the 
late 20
th
 century, but then again complemented it by enforcing democratic forms of 
political participation (Swain 1997). The environmental movement has added a new 
dimension to Indian democracy and civil society and posed an ideological challenge to 
the dominant definitions of development (Gadgil & Guha 1994, 101), as well as had an 
integrative social effect across social cleavages in Indian society otherwise hard to 
overcome by providing a possibility for developing non-class identities (Karan 1994, 
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40; Oommen 2004). The success of many environmental protests may have hampered 
the implementation of some “developmental” government policies, but at the same time, 
they have helped to restore the people's faith in democratic institutions by forcing 
policymakers to be accountable to the people for their actions (Swain 1997, 832).  
Although environmental concerns are relatively new among Indian social movements, 
they have quickly become an overwhelming theme now ranging throughout the non-
profit field. Apart from more impromptu movements, organized Indian civil society 
increasingly works with environmental issues, too. CSOs support local communities in 
their efforts, as well as indulge in general awareness raising, mobilization and 
government pressuring. Environmental organizations also help articulate local 
communities’ views on desirable and sustainable development. This participatory 
process restrains the power of the state and helps to bring it under social control. These 
organizations are increasingly viewed as an integral part of India's development process, 
and their influence on environmental matters has grown. (Swain 1997, 829–830.) 
A wide range of Indian civil society groups working with environmental or 
development issues have recently sought to identify linkages between their work and 
national and global climate debates (Dubash 2012a, 1). On the other hand, the 
domination of climate change in current international environmental discourses has 
been somewhat problematic for Southern environmentalists and has risen unease 
because it possibly threats to divert attention from other local environmental problems, 
often conceived as more pressing and acute (Lele 2012, 208). 
3 Research design 
Having familiarized the reader with the thematic and context, this chapter proceeds to 
assess the content and method of the study. The study at hand can be described as 
empirical research employing qualitative methods, in particular, theory-bound content 
analysis. I introduce an approach that analyzes justifications and engagements to the 
context of civil society and climate politics in India. The climate debate most 
prominently takes place in the “public sphere” (Habermas 2003[1989]). Justification 
theory suggests that making moral statements in the public sphere entails pragmatic 
20 
 
requirements, namely the need to justify arguments. Tensions between the public and 
the familiar in climate change in turn raises questions of communication between these 
levels. The chapter starts with an account of the employed theoretical perspective, 
followed by a presentation of the empirical material that the analysis is based on. Then, 
I make explicit the analysis process by specifying the methods and the concrete way 
they have been applied to this setting. 
3.1 Justification theory and the sociology of engagements 
The politics of climate change constitute a battlefield of various ideas and standpoints. 
A miscellaneous collection of actors make diverse morally loaded claims and back them 
up with different reasoning they find relevant and consider valid in the discussion. 
While it is easier to agree that something must be done about the global threat, it is 
trickier to forge a consensus on priorities, exact measures and responsibilities due to 
highly divergent readings of the situation. Why is it so hard to find a common “focal 
point” on climate change, as Parks and Roberts (2010, 135) observe? How exactly do 
claims differ in their conceptions of what would be right? 
The theoretical starting point of my study is justification theory, which observes the 
capacity of actors to make public, moral statements. Justification theory offers a fruitful 
way to analyze political disputes, such as argumentation regarding climate change. The 
sociology of engagements offers insight on less public ways of being and conversing. In 
this section, I introduce the central premises of these theories and elaborate how the 
chosen theoretical composition can serve in looking for answers for some of the 
questions that the clashes of ideals in climate politics have risen and understand the 
involvement of civil society actors in climate change issues.  
Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot’s justification theory (2006[1991]; 1999) attempts 
to explain human disputes by analyzing the relationship of situations and the actors 
operating in them to commonly acknowledged, higher legitimizing principles. The 
theory observes how people justify their actions and arguments in dispute situations 
regarding right and wrong, and goes further to identify political and moral grammars of 
making issues common. Here, the approach is applied to political debates concerning 
climate change, which tend to include multiple, often competing visions of what is just 
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– of the envisioned common good. The object of disagreement can be conceptualized as 
the relative size, or worth (grandeur), of the different beings present in the situation in 
relation to commonly defined forms of generality. Debates often revolve around shared 
perceptions of what is worthy and what is not. Thévenot’s (2007; 2011a; 2011b) 
extension of the theory is built upon the notion of engagement, which refers to ways of 
relating with the world. Engagement can take various forms, all of which aim at 
ensuring some kind of good, but differ in their requirement of its generalization. 
Boltanski and Thévenot (1999, 359) set forth the idea that “many situations in social life 
can be analyzed by their requirement for the justification of action”. They suggest that 
from ordinary daily situations to high-level debates, the emergence of disagreement 
brings about an imperative of justification. But it is not appropriate to provide just any 
reasons; stances must be grounded in an acceptable manner. Importantly, Boltanski and 
Thévenot conceive of actors as capable of differentiating between legitimate and 
illegitimate ways of rendering criticism and justification. (Ibid., 360, 364.) What makes 
a justification legitimate is its compatibility with a collectively maintained sense of 
fairness (Thévenot 2007, 414). A set of institutionalized modes of justification enable 
referring to principles recognized by the different actors involved in a particular 
situation. Boltanski and Thévenot have developed a grammar of modes of justification 
used in a complex society. Their framework is intended as an itemization of the most 
legitimate repertoires of evaluation, or shared understandings of higher principles 
(principle superior commun). Each principle of equivalence counts with its own scale of 
worth, which allows for passing judgment rooted in the situation and condemning others 
for the lack of virtue. (Boltanski & Thévenot 1999, 360–364.) Each specifies a way 
people and things are “worthwhile for commonality and thus for social esteem.” 
(Thévenot 2011b, 43–44).  
The set of conventions of evaluation that Boltanski and Thévenot (2006[1991], 159–
211; 1999, 370–373) outline in their original work consists of the inspired world, the 
domestic world, the world of fame, the civic world, the market world and the industrial 
world. The inspired world (cité inspirée) values grace, dedication and an immediate 
relationship to an external source of all worth. With climate change claims, an example 
of the presence of an inspired worth are statements recalling humans to connect with 
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nature to save the planet earth. The domestic world (cité domestique) respects inherited 
positions, traditions and hierarchy, whereas the world of fame (cité d’opinion) sees 
recognition from the largest amount of people as a worthy source of legitimacy. A 
domestic mode of justification is apparent for instance when paternal protective reasons 
are given for combating climate change, while within the logic of fame the importance 
of climate change as an issue is proved by its renowned position in the international 
community’s agenda. In the civic world (cité civique), such norms as solidarity, equality 
and democracy are of highest value, as opposed to for example the market world (cité 
marchande) where money acts as the source of worth. A civic justification for climate 
change claims often involves the concern that all people – the planet’s current and 
future inhabitants – have the right to survival. Argumentation based on a market worth 
might demand that we should combat climate change now, because it will be cheaper to 
address the problem sooner rather than later. The industrial world (cité industrielle) for 
its part values efficiency, planning, regulation and scientific expertise. Claims operating 
within the industrial world commonly stress that we should rely on climate science in 
order to plan an effective solution for the best of all.  
The authors derive their division of justification worlds through rigorous sociological 
inquiry and trace a long history of political philosophy for each. Because they are rarely 
made explicit in ordinary contexts, the constructs are extracted from canonical texts 
across Western countries that formalize philosophies of the common good (Boltanski & 
Thévenot 2006[1991], 67)
5
. However, persons are assumed to hold the capacity to 
employ them in their day-to-day disputes, without the burden of specific knowledge of 
their literary embodiments. People simply recognize these commonly accepted criteria 
of critique and apply them in the processes of rending justified opinions and in 
evaluating those of others. The main point is that commonly constructed worlds of 
justification are essential in the ordinary senses of justice people implement in their 
arguments. (Boltanski & Thévenot 1999, 364–366.) 
                                                 
5
 Each order of worth is appointed its own “grammarian”, a theoretician who has best clarified the idea of 
the designated worth: the inspired world – St. Augustine; the domestic world – Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet; 
the world of fame – Thomas Hobbes; the civic world – Jean-Jacques Rousseau; the market world – Adam 
Smith; and the industrial world – comte de Saint-Simon (Boltanski & Thévenot 2006[1991]). 
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The authors distinguish a limited plurality of orders of worth that can be employed to 
support criticisms and agreements in order to build a research strategy that enables 
escaping the choice between “formal universalism” and “unlimited pluralism” 
(Boltanski & Thévenot 1999, 364–365).  However, they emphasize the polities’ 
character as historical constructions and leave open the possibility of some modes of 
justification fading and others emerging over time. This collection of justification 
worlds is by no means the final or only conceivable classification; it is entirely possible 
to discover new sources of moral worth, rising in importance, through empirical study. 
(Ibid., 369; Luhtakallio & Ylä-Anttila 2011, 37.) 
In fact, this has been suggested with the possibility of a “green worth” currently being 
set up, and the addition of “ecology” as a seventh justification world (cité écologique), 
where worth arises from the environment (Boltanski and Thévenot 1999, 369; Lafaye & 
Thévenot 1993; Thévenot et al. 2000, 256–263; Latour 2003)6. In discussions on 
climate change, justifications referring to the environment are indeed endemic. A green 
worth is evoked for example when stating that emissions should be swiftly reduced in 
order to protect fragile ecosystems. An ecological mode of justification is presently 
gaining specificity, but appears to be still often used in combination with other types of 
justifications. Furthermore, while ecology can be invoked by attributing value to nature 
as such, it is in fact sometimes utilized as a constituent of the quality of (human) life, or, 
as a mere cover for other interests. (Lafaye & Thévenot 1993.) Further reflection on 
green worth is interspersed with the empirical analysis.  
Justification theory understands disputes as disagreements within or between 
justification worlds. This means that criticism can take two distinct forms. Legitimate 
critique within an order or worth assesses whether the object under dispute reaches the 
agreed principles; in other words, whether the accepted rule of justification has been 
violated. This type of critique, which Boltanski and Thévenot call a “test”, unveils the 
presence of extraneous beings relevant to another justification world. A more radical 
sort of critique targets the very principle of equivalence. In this case the agents in 
conflict refer to different orders of worth, and argumentation centers on which mode of 
                                                 
6
 For other suggested emerging orders of worth, refer e.g. to Lamont and Thévenot (2000), chapter on 
aesthetic criteria of evaluation. 
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justification to apply in the first place. Here, critique consists of the denunciation 
(dénonciation) of the announced justification from the perspective of another 
justification world. As per the above, disputes can be ended through a reality test that 
reveals whether there are foreign objects in the world the debate takes place in, or, in the 
case of a larger clash between ideals, either by deciding on one world to apply, or by 
agreeing on a compromise (compromise) between different modes of justification. 
(Boltanski & Thévenot 1999, 359, 375.)  
Justification theory makes for an insightful entry point to studying different normative 
standpoints within climate politics. Climate change as a morally loaded issue, which 
provokes intense global disputes but simultaneously requires concerted consensus, is a 
fruitful target for the analysis of justifications. The congruence or non-congruence of 
justifications becomes crucial in the climate debate, as reasoning arising from opposing 
justification worlds often leads to a dead-end instead of dialogue. Yet the urgency of the 
matter desperately calls for agreement to enable action. The aim here is to explore how 
different moral perspectives manifest in the climate change discussion, and inspect what 
kind of versions there are of their juxtaposition or combination. It is especially useful to 
introduce a justification perspective to the controversies of sustainability and 
development that are omnipresent when dealing with climate change in the context of 
India. The challenge of whether poverty and emissions can be reduced in tandem, or 
which target to emphasize on the offset, presents a polemic moral dilemma. Justification 
theory can offer insight on debates centering on the prioritization of competing values 
or on efforts to combine them. In justification terms, discord on “principled beliefs” 
(Parks and Roberts 2010, 146) can head for either denunciation or compromise.  
Not all human action can be interpreted through the justification framework. For 
example love and violence operate within completely distinct systems of social action. 
According to the pragmatic outlook, situations of dispute break the ordinary course of 
action. Evaluation takes the form of the common good only when more local regimes of 
coordination are not sufficient; when arguments seek to be valid in a general sense. 
(Boltanski & Thévenot 1999, 359, 362.) According to Thévenot’s (2007; 2011) further 
theoretical formulations, justifications pertain uniquely to a regime which by rule 
requires referrals to a public interest. The above described grammar constitutes a broad 
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level of coordination in modern society, but one which is not exhaustive of human 
action; other cognitive and evaluative formats are also used in social life. It is possible 
to distinguish formats of smaller scope, additional means of understanding the 
relationship of the human and the surrounding reality.  The sociology of engagements 
elaborates three distinct regimes of engagement with the world in a way that guarantees 
some kind of good.  Regimes differ in their ability to communicate this experience; only 
for justifications the good is a public one. (Thévenot 2007, 415; 2011, 48, 61.)  
The regime of engagement in a plan is what the author considers the most “normal” 
format, as most of the action studied by sociologists pertains to this mode. It is focused 
on autonomous individuals projecting into the future and fulfilling a planned project. 
“Good” is perceived as successful execution of a plan, and concrete reality presents 
itself as a set of functional instruments to reaching this goal. In the justifiable action 
engagement regime, elaborated above, engagement is publicly justifiable for the 
common good. Evaluation must be characterized by generality and legitimacy, and 
persons and things are differently qualified according to the order of worth applied. In 
the regime of familiar engagements, experience is tied to locality, entailing a dynamic 
relation with the close surroundings that one is routinely getting used to: a “milieu 
shaped by continued use”. Familiarity represents a personalized good, where material 
objects act as attachments that facilitate a feeling of comfort.
7
 In this framework, 
practice or habituation is considered of primordial significance in the experience of the 
social and material world. (Thévenot 2007, 416–417; 2011a, 36, 48, 61.) 
It can be assumed that arguments regarding global climate change overwhelmingly 
operate in the regime of public justification. Thévenot (2007, 420) however suggests 
that somewhat paradoxically, imperatives of globalization push economic and political 
organizations closer to persons, mobilizing more local engagements. This theoretical 
formulation allows for considering new arrangements of participatory democratic 
governance, which incorporate multiple levels of society (see e.g. Fung 2003, 531–534). 
                                                 
7
 Thévenot (2011b) has later identified one further regime: that of explorative engagement, where good 
lies in excitement, encountering novelty and discovering something new. This regime clearly comes close 
to the inspired world, with the difference that experience emphasizes the close relationship of the person 
with innovation and abides below the need for public recognition. (Ibid., 48, 51.) This regime is cropped 
out of my theoretical framework as it is found irrelevant from the viewpoint of the material of this study. 
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Matters regarding common good might often call for integrating a variety of voices, not 
only those officially recognized as legitimate speakers (Thévenot 2007, 412). In this 
respect, the sociology of engagements provides an interesting entry point to climate 
change. Effects of the global phenomenon can reach the closest of forms of 
engagement, while decision-making fora by rule operate exclusively in higher levels of 
articulation. The interviews provide insight on how this gap is being bridged in the 
context of fostering participation. 
Parks and Roberts (2010) identify the role that civil society groups can play in 
promoting or rejecting certain ethical standpoints, as well as presenting alternatives to 
dominant paradigms and solutions. This notion of CSOs’ norm work in climate politics 
can be specified by exploring what are the values that civil society actors strive to 
advance. Here, I attempt this in the case of India by mapping ideas promoted by civil 
society and relating them to different moral orders. A break-down of moral 
argumentation provides insight on Indian CSOs’ stands in relation to the country’s 
official negotiating position as well as the other positions present in the global 
negotiation arena, introduced in the previous chapters. Apart from this, I consider to 
what extent the organizations under study offer other things than different perspectives 
on climate politics – most importantly concrete local solutions – and reflect on how 
their climate change work relates to different regimes of engagement.  
Although interested in moral claims, justification theory obviously cannot and should 
not be seen as normative model of justice. Analysis of justifications aims rather at 
“describing the actors’ sense of justice – or more precisely, their sense of injustice”. 
(Boltanski & Thévenot 1999, 364, emphasis added). The approach grasps the way the 
civil society actors readily denounce actions and claims in climate politics whenever 
they observe moral flaws. Justification theory can be used to recognize the normative 
principles underlying persons’ critical activities (ibid.). The sociology of engagements 
offers insight on unformulated criticisms and the reasons for their being impeded. 
Departing from many sociological approaches, Boltanski and Thévenot connect the 
social and the material realities. Testing of statements and actions is understood as only 
partially discursive. Justification theory observes the way disputes link persons and 
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things, as debates involve not only humans but also a miscellaneous array of objects. 
Items do not carry only symbolic meaning; they act as stable referents for arguments, 
and thus enable ending disputes. (Boltanski & Thévenot 1999, 360–361, 367; Thévenot 
2007, 411.) This is especially apparent in the climate debate, with regular references to 
the measurable sea-level, glaciers, atmosphere, and ultimately, the planet that is being 
endangered. Objects can be employed as “proof” for justifications, integrating material 
surroundings into human undertakings. Normatively loaded arguments attempt to 
present a “duly qualified reality” (Thévenot 2007, 411). This type of approach to the so-
called real world helps evade excessive social constructivism (Ylä-Anttila 2010a, 155). 
Justification theory as an approach is distinguishable also in another way. At the core of 
the justification framework is the insight on commonly acknowledged criteria of 
evaluation, which actors hold the “critical capacity” to employ. Disputes are essentially 
about either the fulfillment or the application of criteria. Thus, the framework intends to 
assess both agreement and disagreement. The theory bridges conflict and equilibrium 
theories by focusing both on disputes and on the construction of commonality; on 
disagreement and on common understandings of what is worthy, right and wrong, as the 
basis of critique, which allow dispute situations to hold together. (Boltanski & Thévenot 
1999, 360, 366; Ylä-Anttila 2010a, 148–149.) This offers an intriguing setting where 
disputes can be analyzed as “flashes that momentarily reveal the society’s moral 
structures” (Ylä-Anttila 2010a, 149)8.  
Finally, as opposed to a classical sociological conception of agents characterized by 
membership in a particular social group and bound by structurally reproduced 
dispositions (cf. Bourdieu 1984), Boltanski and Thévenot attempt a social theory 
attentive to the dynamics of action by developing an understanding of individuals 
holding the capacity to switch between ways of relating to the world. Repertoires of 
appointing worth are not permanently attached to the person. (Boltanski & Thévenot 
1999, 367; Thévenot 2007, 410; 2011, 43, 45.) This setting sheds light on the way 
actors “use” values in practice. But unlike currents of the more usual framing approach 
often employed when studying civil society activists’ rhetoric, it does not assume an 
                                                 
8
 Translation by author. 
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individual simply choosing “tools” suitable for any given situation (cf. Benford & Snow 
2000, 624). Following later “cultural” frames approaches, justification theory 
recognizes structural factors in framing activities, but goes on to consider the constraints 
of their usage in different arenas. It identifies the most legitimate ways of stating stands, 
grounded in the critique of injustice (Lamont & Thévenot 2000, 6–7; Thévenot et al. 
2000, 238.) Political sociology typically assumes that actors hide particularistic 
interests, which they frame to be compatible with collective ones. Framing in social 
movements’ study is usually analyzed as intentional, as opposed to Goffman (1974) 
who developed the term as the basis of social interaction (Ylä-Anttila 2010b, 292). 
When analyzing collectively upheld modes of coordination, I consider CSOs’ 
“collective action frames” (Benford & Snow 2000, 613–622) – commonly adopted 
conceptualizations of the problem that allow for action – as having developed through a 
process of acts of justification that have become habitualized.  
This study enlarges upon the moral dimension of CSOs’ concrete and discursive climate 
change work. It approaches argumentation as not simply rhetoric, but involving also the 
provision of evidence to support an envisioned common good (Thévenot et al. 2000, 
238). Furthermore, besides tracing discourses, it charts structural and cultural reasons 
for the prevalence of certain shared principles and conventions of argumentation.  
3.2 Research material 
The research data used in this study consists of interviews with Indian civil society 
actors engaged in climate politics. It includes thirteen interviews with representatives of 
CSOs working with climate change issues. In-depth interviews constitute new, relevant 
and elaborate material for examining the CSOs’ actions and arguments. The interviews 
at hand are expert interviews by nature, as interviewed individuals were chosen based 
on position rather than personal characteristics – although personal views are also 
included in the analysis in the form of value-laden statements. A total of fifteen persons 
from thirteen different CSOs were interviewed for the analysis. While most of them 
were individual interviews, two of the interviews were conjoined. The duration of the 
interviews was from forty minutes to over two hours, resulting in approximately 15 
hours of audio material. Once transcribed, the interviews amounted to a total of roughly 
350 pages of text. A quarter of the respondents are female and the rest male. 
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The organizations represented in the research material are: Centre for Science and 
Environment (CSE), The Energy and Resources Institute (TERI), Climate Action 
Network South Asia (CANSA), Greenpeace, World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), 
India Youth Climate Network (IYCN), Carbon Minus India (CMI), Development 
Alternatives (DA), South Asian Dialogues on Ecological Democracy (SADED), La Via 
Campesina South Asia, Public Advocacy Initiatives for Rights and Values in India 
(PAIRVI), Delhi Greens, and the Prakriti Ke Sipahi campaign. In the following, I 
briefly present the interviewed parties. 
CSE is an influential Indian environmental research and advocacy organization 
promoting sustainable and equitable development and democracy. TERI is another large 
environmental research organization with heavy policy-influence capacity in the climate 
change discussion of the country, albeit more inclined to analysis and innovation of 
efficient use of energy and natural resources. These two organizations are 
overwhelmingly identified as the main civil society players in the climate debate in 
India, both in previous literature on environmental politics in India (see e.g. Jakobsen 
1998; Rajan 1997) and through interviews. CAN South Asia is a cross-border network 
for civil society groups working with climate change issues on the subcontinent, and 
forms part of the international Climate Action Network. Greenpeace is a well-known 
non-governmental environmental organization with extensive international reach, with 
the activities of its Indian branch ranging from climate change and energy revolution to 
sustainable agriculture. WWF is an equally global organization concentrating on 
conservation, research and restoration of the environment. IYCN strives to engage 
Indian youth in climate-related activity. CMI aims at bringing down emissions in India 
through multi-stakeholder engagement. DA is a non-profit research agency that 
innovates and designs ecological solutions with marginalized communities in rural 
settings. SADED is a regional organization promoting democratic control over natural 
resources as a way to the survival of humankind. La Via Campesina South Asia forms 
part of an international movement advocating peasants’ rights. PAIRVI works with 
raising the civil society’s voice in public policy-making in India by strengthening 
grassroots organizations’ advocacy skills. Delhi Greens is formed by a group of 
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environmentalist bloggers and activists concerned with sustainable development issues 
in urban India. Finally, Prakriti is a student activist lead climate awareness campaign.
 9
 
The group of interviewees comprises of varied actors who represent different levels of 
civil society. Organizationally it makes up for a diverse collection, with agents from 
small-scale campaigners to the main players in the field. The types of positions of the 
individuals who took part in the interviews range from activists to long-time 
professionals, with interviewed persons’ titles including campaign coordinators, 
program managers, research fellows and director generals. In general, many of the 
interviewees represent a grassroots perspective on climate politics. From their 
standpoint, they may contribute alternative information vis-à-vis government statements 
and challenge official discourses on climate change – as originally intended. Anyhow, 
in the course of the data-collection process, I came to realize that parts of the more 
established civil society actors in India tend to represent an elite vantage point 
compared to the “masses”. Hence, some are more aligned with and connected to official 
instances while others have a more challenging take. Civil society is the main channel 
for India’s underprivileged to voice their concerns, but some of the CSOs are to more or 
less “hijacked” by the elite (Ommen 2004, 132).  
In selecting the interviewees, I initially relied on an extensive “Who’s Who” directory 
on climate change in India (Mehra 2010). Further interviewees were also identified 
through snowball sampling, making use of suggestions and connections of interviewed 
persons, in order to reach the actors considered integral on the ground. Based on the 
scale of actors and organizations brought up in the interviews themselves, and on the 
account of the Indian professor co-supervising my work, the final list of interviewees 
can be considered a reliable sample. As a conscious demarcation, all of the interviews 
took place in New Delhi, because the most essential organizations have their 
headquarters there, and since one study could not possibly cover the entire civil society 
in a country the size of India. It should be noted that this makes the observed 
                                                 
9
 Descriptions draw on interviews and information found on the organizations’ websites: 
www.cseindia.org; www.teriin.org; www.cansouthasia.net; www.iycn.in; www.greenpeace.org/india; 
www.wwfindia.org; www.carbonminus.org; www.devalt.org; www.saded.in; 
www.lvcsouthasia.blogspot.com; www.pairvi.org; delhigreens.com; 
www.prakritinatureindia.blogspot.com. 
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organizations privileged on the offset in terms of influence capacity and connectedness, 
and thus not necessarily representative of the general CSO field and their level of 
participation in all of India’s corners. A further remark is that all of the interviews were 
conducted in English, which limits the group of potential interviewees, or rather, tells 
something about the selected individuals and organizations and their backgrounds. 
Besides geographical limitations, I could not have included many of the actors operating 
on a more local level due to the lack of a shared language. A closer look reveals that the 
array of civil society actors on climate change is actually quite small in relation to the 
country’s size; there are no more than roughly a hundred CSOs in total operating in 
India with any link to climate change worth a directory mention (ibid.), and the most 
active ones are all included in the material. Furthermore, as will be seen in the analysis, 
the interviews clearly indicate that the mass environmental movements of rural India 
have not adopted climate change as part of their primary agenda. Thus, the sample of 
metropolitan CSOs can in fact be considered very representative perhaps not of the 
entire civil society field as such, but indeed of the part of civil society that participates 
in climate politics. I do not imply that the results found here be directly generalized to 
the whole of Indian civil society, but do assume that the overall discussion and 
prevailing positions are reflected in particular organizations and their statements. 
I undertook fieldwork for the thesis project in India in January and February 2013, and 
collected part of the interview data then. The data collection trip was also an occasion 
for immersing in the exploration of relevant specialized literature. Five of the interviews 
were performed by me, four by Dr. Tuomas Ylä-Anttila in January 2012, one by Dr. 
Pradip Swarnakar in February 2013, and three by Jayanthi A. Pushkaran in March and 
April 2013. I carefully selected these additional interviews conducted under the CLIC 
research project to include in my analysis, some of them arranged during my fieldwork 
but scheduled for later on with local connections on site.  
The interviews were semi-structured (cf. e.g. Ruusuvuori & Tiittula 2005, 11–12). All 
interviewers used more or less the same interview frame, allowing nonetheless for some 
flexibility in conducting the interviews and for room for the respondents’ initiative. The 
interviewees were asked about their activities concerning climate change, as well as 
their conceptions on the public debate on climate change in the country and their 
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participation in it. Questions also aimed at illuminating the actors’ opinions on “climate 
justice”, and encouraged them to express their views, aspirations and ambitions 
regarding climate policy. Lastly, personal motivation for working with climate change 
issues was inquired. For increased validity, the view constructed on the actors’ outlook 
on climate politics is based on a composition of a variety of intersecting questions that 
approach the subject matter from different but related entry points.
10
 
As with all research based on interviews, the contextual nature of information as formed 
within the interview situation should be acknowledged. The relationship of the 
interviewer and the interviewee makes its mark on the outcome of the discussion, as do 
the institutionalized participant roles of the interviewer and interviewee. The 
interviewer, being in control of the course of the conversation, is often seen as holding 
the power in the interview situation. On the other hand, the interviewee counts with the 
“epistemic rights”, by virtue of their position as the informant. (Ruusuvuori & Tiittula 
2005, 22–23, 29–34.) An additional challenge of setting here lies in the evident North–
South juxtaposition, which is present not only in some of the themes of the interview, 
but also in the composition of the interview situation. I, for instance, was not only in the 
position of the interviewer, but also in the position of a foreigner, an outsider and a 
representative of the “rich” countries, as well as a younger woman. In some of the cases, 
it is probable that the fact that the interviewer is from the North has affected to the 
dynamics of the situation
11
. All in all, the interviewees seemed open to share their views 
on the theme and embraced their epistemic rights, positioned as informants with 
knowledge about the civil society field in India and the frills of national politics, which 
made the output of the interviews as a whole satisfactory. An asset regarding the 
mentioned challenge in setting is that the analyzed material incudes in equal amounts 
both male and female interviewers and foreign and Indian ones, which helps dilute 
possible bias in response, or more precisely, any effect that differences (or similarities) 
in nationality, “culture”, gender or age might have had on the outcome of interviews (cf. 
                                                 
10
 The questionnaire template I used can be found in appendix 2. 
11
 One interviewee in particular repeatedly addresses the interviewer as a representative of the affluent 
countries (“you do this you do that…”), and a recurrent use of negation is detectable in his speech. 
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Ruusuvuori & Tiittula 2005, 87–93).12 Ultimately, this possible effect seems to not be 
of major importance: patterns detected in interviews do not fluctuate with distinct 
interviewers, but with wholly different aspects, which the analysis chapters will unveil. 
The interviewed individuals participated in this research project voluntarily; informed 
consent is the starting point of every interview. The content of the interviews is not 
particularly sensitive or pose serious ethical challenges as the interviewees express 
similar statements in public as part of their campaign work. However, in my analysis I 
only refer to the interviewees in an anonymous fashion, having removed direct 
identifiers, so as to ensure that individual persons or the organizations they represent 
cannot be directly identified through the text. I do not connect specific quotes to specific 
CSOs or explicitly link interviewees to their organization. More fruitful information can 
be expected to arise in the interview situations if a degree of anonymity can be 
guaranteed for participants. In the following chapters, I will refer to the interviewees as 
I1, I2, I3 et cetera (in the case of the conjoint interviews as I4a and I4b and I9a and I9b 
respectively, in order to separate individual speakers). The collected interviews will 
only be used for research purposes, and the numbering system adopted here differs from 
ones that other researchers within the project potentially working with some of the same 
material in the future might rely on.  
The structure of the interviews, the collection of respondents, and the variety of 
interviewers make the material a reliable source of information on the research subject. 
In addition to collecting the above described interview material, I did an extensive 
review of information found on the CSOs’ websites13 and of climate change related 
documents produced by the organizations in order to support (and challenge) the view 
developed through the interviews. Although not part of the analysis material per se, 
specific documents are referred to in the course of the analysis when necessary, but are 
not itemized here in line with the aspiration of retaining the anonymity of individual 
respondents. 
                                                 
12
 This setting is robust because the interview material is treated as one mass. The versatility of interview 
situations increases the cogency of the material. Individual interviews need not be commensurate, as I am 
not comparing specific organizations with each other, in which case differences between interview 
situations – and the effect of interviewers – might in turn distort results.  
13
 See footnote 7 for websites. 
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3.3 Analysis process 
Before moving on to the results of the study, I will briefly describe the method of 
analysis used in this research. Empirical analysis aims at creating a clear description of 
the phenomenon at hand based on the research material. The point of qualitative 
analysis is to increase the informational value of the available material by creating a 
sensible and consistent interpretation of what is of essence in a fragmentary data. This is 
achieved through a process of logical reasoning, which involves taking apart and 
reducing the material in order to reassemble, re-group, and re-conceptualize it into a 
coherent entity. (Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2009, 108–113.)  
The particular method employed in this study is an application of qualitative content 
analysis. I embark upon theory-bound content analysis, where the analysis is heavily 
influenced by the chosen theoretical staring point. Groups of arguments are derived 
from the data and then further divided with the categories of justification and regimes of 
engagement in mind. Applying justification theory in a flexible way makes for an 
attractive approach for the purposes of this study. Arguably, justification theory is 
useful in combining the itemization of universalistic moral principles with cultural 
sensitivity (Luhtakallio & Ylä-Anttila 2011, 35, 45). Empirical sensitivity is especially 
important when studying justification processes in differing political cultures. The 
analysis of justifications allows recognizing common points of reference for actors 
tapping into global debates across boundaries, but also capturing particularities of 
political cultures and of specific disputes (ibid.). 
In theory-bound content analysis, the starting point for the thought process of the 
researcher alternates between emphasis on the empirical material and on ready-made 
models. Thus, theory supports the analysis of the material, but analysis is not directly 
based on it. The material itself is given space to direct the analysis, as analysis units are 
initially chosen from the material. Yet theory guides the analysis phase: at the 
abstraction stage empirical material is connected to the selected theoretical concepts. 
(Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2009, 96–97, 108, 117–118.) To illustrate, this study is grounded in 
the material taken that the categories and sub-categories of what is of interest were 
formed based on the interviews, but on the other hand theory-driven in the sense that I 
looked for ethically relevant statements in the data in the first place. In the advanced 
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phase of the analysis process, the distribution of moral claims into different modes of 
justification was brought in as a guiding idea, and the discovered empirical content was 
reflected upon in the light of this categorization. 
A number of points that need to be acknowledged when analyzing interview material 
were discussed in the previous section while presenting the data. Interpretation of so-
called expert interviews often involves taking some of the information produced in the 
interview situation as facts about the phenomenon under study (Alastalo & Åkerman 
2010). The scheme developed here consists of combining reading of “facts” derived 
from the interviews with the reading of cultural understandings present in them in the 
following manner (cf. ibid., 387).  
The analysis chapters proceed from the more concrete towards the more abstract. First, I 
engage in informant-type reading of interviewees’ work on climate change and CSOs’ 
role in climate politics in India. Chapter 4 presents the findings on what they do. This 
kind of reading of the empirical material calls for triangulation to ensure validity: I will 
refer to literature on environmental politics and political culture in India and climate 
change and civil society in general to support the picture of CSOs’ climate change work 
developed through the data. When looking for facts produced within the interview 
process, it is essential to combine information from different sources (Alastalo & 
Åkerman 2010, 377, 390). Here, this is done by conjoining evidence retrieved from 
multiple informants, as well as supporting impressions with background research. 
The next level involves adopting a more discursive approach. This features classifying 
arguments that civil society representatives present related to climate change. 
Arguments are then located within the justification scheme by identifying orders of 
worth that different arguments lean on. Chapters 5 thus discusses what they say and 
pursue, and why. I go on to analyze how the arguments relate to each other regarding the 
higher principles evoked in each, and sketch out lines of conflict and potential for 
consensus on a common good. This endeavor includes mapping combinations of 
justification and the positioning of distinct justification worlds in relation to each other 
within the arguments. I also contemplate whether some actions and arguments operate 
outside the regime of public justification that demands references to a common good. 
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To tie the discursive to the practical, a review of the action-orientations of organizations 
that present each type of arguments is built into the analysis of claims. The round-up 
part of the chapter incorporates discussion on the relative power of different arguments 
and associated reflection regarding political culture in India. 
I have made use of the Atlas.TI qualitative data analysis software. As a supporting tool, 
it enables systematic categorization and coding of the material. In practice, I 
consistently separated from the transcripts 1) talk on different activities the interviewees 
pursue, from which the repertoires of action slowly took shape, and 2) morally relevant 
claims, which in turn were categorized into argument types; first sorting statements in a 
more intuitive fashion, and then with the categories of justification theory as an 
overarching framework.  
The analysis provides an overall picture of the climate change discussion as presented 
by the interviewed CSO actors. It contemplates on the moral construction of the 
argumentation scene as a common ground for deliberation, which relies on actors’ 
shared understanding of the legitimate principles behind diverse claims. Thus, it does 
not study the dispute as tied to specific actors. In other words, the reader should not 
expect an itemized list of who says what; rather than pinning justifications to actors, the 
goal is to detect prevalent forms of argumentation and outline argument blocks and 
oppositions.  
Another consideration that should be mentioned at this point is that it is not of essence 
whether the actors making the claims are themselves aware of the “justification worlds” 
they invoke – most often they obviously are not. Referring to institutionalized literary 
constructions is not assumed to be conscious, even though invoking the basic moral 
tenets they crystallize frequently is. Like Boltanski and Thévenot (1999, 366), I do not 
suggest that ordinary members of society “have actually read the works” used to outline 
legitimate orders of worth. Such an assumption would certainly make no sense when 
studying actors that come from a very different cultural environment than Boltanski and 
Thévenot. Although counting with not just French society but a wider history of 
Western philosophy as its base, their theory of justification worlds has been created in a 
substantially different context than that of India – a country that carries its own vibrant 
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and long-standing philosophical traditions, which might be used as the starting point of 
similar theorizing on their own and perhaps result in a quite different set of justification 
worlds (see e.g. Chandhoke 2010; Singh & Mohapatra 2010).  
Justification theory and the sociology of engagements have been demonstrated to work 
in various cultural backdrops. Apart from European settings, they have been 
successfully applied for example to the contexts of North America (Lamont & Thévenot 
2000), Russia (Koveneva 2011; Lonkila 2011) and Indonesia (see Thévenot 2011a, 13–
14), as well as Indian media discussion (Huikuri 2011). Here, I further experiment with 
this theoretical framework in essentially different cultural premises from where it was 
developed. Presuming that the contexts of Indian and European civil societies are quite 
dissimilar, I extensively discuss contextual specificities in tandem with the analysis. 
Also, as described, I do not mechanically allocate the material to the categories of 
justification theory: coding was first data-driven and the analysis then deepened with 
the examination of underlying justification worlds to explore how the categories of 
justification fit the empirical evidence. Towards the end of the study, I contemplate 
whether the data somehow challenges the framework of analysis. 
It must be pointed out, however, that instead of operating in a silo, most urban Indian 
CSOs have for long interacted with the global civil society. Particularly with climate 
change as a global problem, and many CSOs participating in climate politics being 
firmly internationally connected, this theoretical approach was initially considered 
appropriate since actors presumably seek to influence climate issues by speaking in the 
world polity’s “language”, which favors generalization. Based on the results, I consider 
to what extent CSOs in India articulate their concerns in a similar way as the global 
civil society and the climate political regime in general, or whether they tend to talk 
within a divergent discourse and validate their arguments in a somewhat different 
manner. This composition provides insight on the particularities – distinctive features 
and resemblances – of the CSOs’ argumentation regarding climate change, without 
over-emphasizing difference or falling into essentialization.  
Within the next three chapters, I set out to present my results and discuss them with 
reference to previous research. 
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4 Repertoire of action  
My research zooms in on Indian CSOs engaged in a wide range of climate change work, 
from lobbying to promoting sustainable everyday practices. This chapter assesses what 
the interviewed civil society actors do regarding climate change. It maps the working 
space of civil society as identified through the interviews, and introduces some of the 
ways CSOs operating in India take part in climate politics on a local, national or 
international level. The various actions can be divided into the following fields of 
activities, although obviously they are more often than not intertwined: awareness-
raising, policy advocacy, research, mitigation strategies and adaptation support. In the 
following, this set of activities is used as a categorization to explore civil society in the 
climate change field in India. Each set of activities is given a general account and 
discussed regarding a few specific points of interest. 
4.1 Awareness-raising 
 “--in the normal media you don't get to see much of a climate change 
 debate, neither in terms of the national politics, global politics, nor in 
 terms of how the people are adapting […] Climate change is something 
 which is invisible.” (I3) 
In India, the general level of awareness on climate change is comparatively low. A 
recent study (Leiserowitz & Jagadish 2012, 18) states that approximately forty percent 
of Indians are ignorant about climate change. As a response, one of the main climate 
change activities reported by the interviewees is awareness-raising concerning the 
public. These pursuits refer to activities that aim to educate people on the phenomenon 
and its causes and effects. Knowledge dissemination often takes the form of sensitizing 
citizens on climate issues through environmental education or participatory activities. 
Some of the interviewed organizations also invest in covering and reporting on 
international climate negotiations, and thus passing on and transmitting information to 
the grassroots – both by translating information into local languages, and by making 
sense of often complicated outputs thick with political jargon.  
Many organizations also attempt to have a media presence, as they lament that climate 
change is not a much debated theme in the media, and the public debate on climate 
change is not very sophisticated.  One interviewee captures the thoughts of many when 
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observing that “--it is affecting the life of our people, but media is still not very active in 
this field” (I2). Climate change is reportedly not a widely treated issue in the national 
media over all; many say that there is an increase in coverage mainly around COPs, and 
that media coverage is “occasion-based, it's not a continuous process” (I1).  
Interestingly, research has documented lively debate on climate change issues in India. 
Writers have observed that media discussion on climate change and global climate 
governance has in fact dramatically increased, at least around international climate 
negotiations (Billet 2010; Dubash 2012a; Vihma 2011). It has even been noted that 
climate negotiations receive more attention in Indian press than in its Finnish 
counterpart (Huikuri 2011, 63). Potential reasons for these apparently contradicting 
interpretations of media attention include that being deeply engaged in a given issue 
probably goes hand in hand with a feeling that it is not recognized to a sufficient extent 
and level of complexity by other actors, and that CSOs by profession complain on lack 
of attention to their cause. But also, studies have generally concentrated on a few 
English-speaking national newspapers, which circulation and target group does not 
necessarily make them representative of the media exposure of the average Indian. 
Overall, the interviewees perceive that more recently people have started connecting 
some public concerns to climate change, and, that civil society’s views have a decent 
presence in public discussion on issues linked to climate change.  
CSOs awareness-raising efforts often come with hopes of activating people for the 
cause. Mobilization can also be understood as an instrument in the discursive battles for 
the definition of the climate problem. There undoubtedly is a certain power in numbers: 
the more participation there is behind civil society groups, the more visible their 
message becomes. Thus, awareness-raising can also be linked to the activity presented 
next: advocacy towards decision-makers. In a democratic context awareness-raising 
includes an element of instrumentality, as “mass” can help push for desired policies. 
The following quotes reflect this side of climate change work: 
“--civil society has two important goals to play, one is to be honest and 
persuade their own governments to do the best thing and the second 
thing is, is even more important and significant, is to raise awareness 
amongst the – because ultimately government […] will do only what is 
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politically viable. So unless and until there is a political constitution 
among the people of one type of policy intervention, they would not want 
to do that, right?” (I5) 
“I’m also trying this because, see, if […] it’s a big group and they have, if 
they demand something, [the government] cannot deny them, it cannot 
ignore them.” (I8) 
Many interviewees express the apprehension that voters in India are commonly wooed, 
as having adherent behind oneself brings power and potential for influencing decisions 
and policies. The problematic aspect is that citizens are often uneducated and as such 
susceptible to manipulation. The CSOs consider it important to capacitate people to take 
part in the climate change discussion. Knowledgeable individuals have a chance at 
making enlightened choices and, if needed (and conveniently for the CSOs), push the 
government towards hoped-for directions.  
Awareness-raising distinctively involves the act of making an inaccessible or 
incomprehensible issue understandable for a wider audience. The interviewees report 
looking for ways to establish a “link between climate change and the person’s everyday 
life” (I4b). Climate change issues are approached through a different lens on the ground 
than in policy debates: “when you go and talk to people, you don’t need to be citing 
scientific studies” (I6). One interviewee expresses that “it would be useful if the debates 
started at the personalized level” (I3). Arguably, when national and international climate 
policies are implemented and made understandable at the local level, a movement in 
formats of engagement with the world from the more general towards the more personal 
takes place (cf. Thévenot 2007, 420). CSOs may facilitate this process by articulating 
concerns in multiple registers. An example of this is translating high-level decisions into 
something that makes sense at the grassroots. Movement in forms of engagement in the 
opposite direction is necessary when attempting to make the voices of the grassroots 
heard in the public climate discussion. In the arena of climate politics, concerns must be 
expressed in a way that meets the qualifications of the public sphere. Next, I move on to 
covering the Indian CSOs’ advocacy work, which takes on the language of publicly 
justifiable action when directing concerns to decision-making levels. 
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4.2 Policy advocacy 
In the past decade, a marked opening up of public spaces to debate environmental issues 
has taken place (e.g. Moody & Thévenot 2000). This section discusses the way Indian 
CSOs take part in the public politics of climate change. Advocacy can be considered the 
most visible and influential type of work the organizations do. It is entangled with many 
of the others field of action presented in this chapter. The ultimate goal of advocacy 
work is to influence official decision-making. Advocacy can take the form of lobbying 
and campaigning efforts, or attempting to impose pressure towards governments or 
private actors. Organizations can also offer their aid in formulating climate policies, and 
while doing so, try to include viewpoints they consider important. Furthermore, civil 
society actors often push through concerns in the public debate through the media.  
Advocacy efforts can be further divided into actions directed to the national level on one 
hand and to the international arena on the other. Internationally, CSOs can participate 
directly in COPs with an observer status, and attempt to influence negotiations through 
announcing comments and on-the-spot lobbying, as well as arranging or participating in 
side-events at international climate summits. Many of the larger organizations also 
engage in transnationally coordinated campaign action. It is often commented that civil 
society groups have potential for acting as links between affected people and the policy-
making level (e.g. Dombrowski 2010). Apart from the differences in experiencing and 
addressing these levels due to distinct formats of engagement, in climate change this 
breach is particularly difficult to overcome due to an implicit requirement of scientific 
understanding of the phenomenon to take part in the public discussion (cf. Gough & 
Shackley 2001). Expert speakers are valued within this discourse, and certain kind of 
precise “proof” for arguments is appreciated. 
The interviewees recount that out of recent national decision-making processes that civil 
society has been involved in, the most important example is the preparation of the 
National Action Plan on Climate Change (NAPCC). The Action Plan, released in 2008, 
announces the state’s intended measures for addressing climate change while 
simultaneously promoting development objectives (Government of India 2008, 2). It 
vocalizes the view that maintaining a high growth rate is essential both for raising 
people out of poverty and for reducing their vulnerability to the impacts of climate 
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change (ibid.). Thus, it links demands for pursuing development in a traditional 
economic sense with climate change adaptation capacity. Vihma (2011, 76–77) 
observes that the NAP tries to cope with the challenges of maintaining the position of 
Northern responsibility for the problem while also setting domestic mitigation efforts.  
Rather than domestic insistence, the NAP was more probably a reaction to growing 
international pressure, which can be regarded the main incentive for India to formulate 
more ambitious climate policy (Dubash 2012b, 50; Vihma 2011, 87–88). Some of the 
interviewees resent international reference groups as a motivator, implying that actions 
should be taken primarily for the stake of the state’s actual constituency: its own people. 
These comments imply denouncing actions pertaining to unacceptable orders of worth 
or forms of engagement – namely to pursuing fame or subsuming to the regime of 
engagement in a plan – form the perspective of civic worth; a mode of justification 
discussed in more detail in the following chapter. The final document was received with 
mixed feelings among civil society in terms of sufficiency of commitment and 
ambitiousness of plans. Above all, the NAP is criticized in the interviews for not being 
produced through an appropriately consultative process. This, too, denotes critique 
evoking civic principles. Only some of the larger organizations and research institutes 
were involved in the preparative process; a few of the most influential ones stand out in 
having produced major inputs for the NAP. 
While virtually all of the interviewed instances are to some degree active in advocacy 
work within India, participation on the international level is less consistent. The ability 
to communicate directly in the international climate debate seems to depend on 
adequate financial and human resources. Some CSOs regularly take part in COPs, while 
others have done so but now prefer to concentrate on more concrete endeavors. Apart 
from the issue of resources, international engagement is also a question of the 
organizations’ chosen strategy and prioritized approach. 
A few of the more recognized organizations actually seem to have had quite an effect in 
shaping the Indian government’s international negotiating position. The interviews 
disclose the observation that civil society has had a considerable role in building India’s 
climate political stance. The following extracts reveal the scope of the influence: 
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“--if you really look at some of the international negotiating positions 
which have been there for a very long time, consistent positions, they 
were originally promoted and articulated by some of the civil society 
organizations. For instance, the concept of common but differentiated 
responsibilities as an articulation of equity or per capita emission basis 
[…]” (I5) 
“--[CSOs] have been influencing decision-making to a very large 
extent […] government position, it's pretty much the same with what 
the kind of position we have. There are some differences in when you 
come down to specific […] issues, but overall, broadly I think we agree on 
equity […]” (I4a) 
The quotes suggest that India’s basic equity position has in fact been introduced by civil 
society actors. Although it has been asserted that CSOs have a slight tendency to over-
estimate their influence (Gulbrandsen & Andresen 2004, 72), the credibility of these 
statements is increased by the fact that they do not represent merely auto-reflection, but 
rather refer to the accomplishments of other organizations as well.  
A particular record of civil society influence in defining the climate change agenda in 
India is held by a report by the Centre for Science and Environment titled “Global 
Warming in an Unequal World: A Case of Environmental Colonialism” (Agarwal & 
Narain 1991), which played a role in formulating India’s traditional stance on climate 
change. The report, mentioned in the majority of interviews, and its postcolonial 
standpoint have influenced the Indian position in international negotiations for over two 
decades (Vihma 2011, 78). It constitutes a counter-report to a World Resources Institute 
report that ranked India as the fourth largest contributor to climate change globally 
(WRI 1990), dismissing its results as “based less on science and more on politically 
motivated and mathematical jugglery” (Agarwal & Narain 1991, 1). Results are 
challenged on the grounds that population size should be considered when ranking 
countries by emissions, and a differentiation should be made between “luxury 
emissions” of the rich and “subsistence emissions” of the poor. Moreover, the writers 
question the accuracy of the measurements themselves and embark on renewed 
calculations, coming to the conclusion that India is responsible for a much smaller share 
of global emissions. The report raises suspicion of rich countries’ actual motives for 
hindering India’s development. (Agarwal & Narain 1991.) 
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The Indian government swiftly adopted the rationale of the report as the backbone of its 
position in international climate negotiations (Jakobsen 1998, 22–24; Lele 2012, 209; 
Vihma 2011, 78).  This denotes that “some of the equity positions were taken up by the 
government from the civil society initially, and then the government stuck to those 
positions […] – it remains the fundamental and primary question” (I5). The Indian 
government then pushed for the adoption of its favored ideas and rules regarding 
responsibility on the international level, shaping the architecture of the climate regime 
(Sengupta 2012, 104, 115).  
Great differences understandably exist in influence capacity among CSO actors: some 
directly sit in committees and advisory boards writing policy papers, while others rely 
on more informal routes to have an effect. Jayal (2011, 133) observes how a difference 
exists between the influence capacity of environmental movements and officially 
organized civil society in India. The state has been “unresponsive and even hostile” 
towards movements but has in contrast often encouraged involvement of CSOs (ibid.). 
More established organizations are better received than ones with a more fluid body of 
adherents. Through the interviews, it also became clear that personal connections are 
essential for obtaining possibilities to affect plans and policies in the country. They are 
crucial for the ability to “get through the door” and to be listened to. Networks and 
contacts to key official actors are more readily available to access for representatives of 
the more established organizations than activists of the more grassroots oriented ones.  
Gulbrandsen and Andresen (2004) refer to this kind of social capital as “insider 
capacity”. Insider capacity seems to be of vital importance for CSO influence; the 
interviews signal that perhaps especially so in the case of India’s governance structure. 
The authors suggest that in climate politics, CSO’s can pursue either an insider strategy 
or an outsider strategy. The first entails seeking to attain influence by working closely 
with negotiators and governments, providing expert advice in the form of policy 
solutions and research-based reports. The latter means taking a counter-position in 
relation to official instances: pressuring governments and other target groups through 
campaigning and protesting. Smaller activist groups might prefer outsider strategies, 
while organizations with abundant resources are likely to pursue a dual strategy. 
Interestingly, organizations with an entrenched advisory role like to profile themselves 
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through insider strategies only (Gulbrandsen & Andresen 2004, 56–57.) This strain of 
thought is developed further in the next section describing research activities. 
4.3 Research activities 
Research forms the basis of climate change related work in many larger organizations. 
These activities are indeed restricted to organizations that have the capacity and 
resources to undertake credible research. Producing plausible studies brings certain 
prestige to the organizations engaging in this activity. Subjects of investigation range 
from climate policy to energy, technology and finance. Research endeavors provide 
inputs to the other actions taken by organizations: most notably, they feed into advocacy 
efforts. They also support the aspect of informing the general public, especially when it 
comes to regular environmental reports. Research may also be a principal input into 
mitigation efforts. One interviewee describes their research activities as both conducting 
independent studies and supporting the government: 
 “--we come out with independent research on climate negotiations [and] 
 climate policy, both at national as well as international level. And [we] 
 also assist – provide input for the government of India in drafting 
 national policy, as well. It's technical support for the negotiations. And at 
 sub-national level we have drafted state action plans for a couple of 
 states.” (I5) 
This quote hints on a characteristic division among the CSOs work. Oommen notes that 
state and civil society are not always in conflict; there are contexts where they are 
complimentary (Oommen 2004, 16). Indeed, during the interviews it became clear that 
in India, there is an apparent existing need from the part of the government to rely on 
the research proficiency of CSOs to support planning and decision-making processes on 
climate change issues. The Indian state often “draws upon the skills offered by NGOs” 
to support its environmental governance efforts (Jayal 2001, 145). Rajan (1997, 105), 
aptly remarks how reports that are sometimes “commissioned by the MoEF” (Ministry 
of Environment and Forests), boomerang to enforce the country’s defensive stance on 
international environmental politics. Hence, CSOs’ reports have on one hand influenced 
national climate politics, but on the other, they are called for by official instances.  
It seems that some of the larger organizations are deeply integrated with ministries such 
as the MoEF, which makes it hard to trace some “actual” level of their influence. The 
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complex web of national climate politics in India in which so-called civil society 
organizations are entangled in to varying degrees does not constitute a straight-forward 
model of influencing climate change policy-making, where civil society groups strive to 
push through given viewpoints whose inclusion or exclusion in some final draft can 
later be systematically tested (cf. Corell & Betsill 2001). For some interviewees, “--it 
doesn't really sound like influencing for us […] because you are writing for them” (I5).  
Differences in governmental capacity in addressing and conceptualizing climate change 
issues exist between countries; in India these abilities need to be complemented by 
competent non-governmental organizations specializing in climate change issues. This 
provides a niche for influence. On the other hand, close engagement with the state might 
signify reduced independence for the civil society party. As a whole, the composition 
does not make the process exemplary regarding consultativeness, as the bulk of 
possibilities to influence are limited to large organizations with affiliations to official 
parties. Others have to settle for more or less “for show” consultations in their 
cooperation with the government, or otherwise rely on acts of resistance.  
Gough and Shackley (2001, 333) identify two sets of civil society actors engaged in 
climate politics: campaigners, or the more familiar environmental groups on one hand, 
and research-based think tanks on the other. The latter are professional scientists 
engaged in technical analysis and policy dialogue. Similarly, Gulbrandsen and 
Andresen (2004, 56) make a distinction between activist organizations and advisory 
organizations in climate politics, with the previous ones obtaining funding and 
legitimacy through popular support, and the second type through their “ability to give 
policy recommendations and advise decision-makers on legal, technical and scientific 
matters” (ibid.). The choice of action of the organization types are closely related to the 
above discussed insider and outsider strategies. In the case of climate politics in India 
research activities pertain quite distinctively, albeit not consistently, to insider strategies 
– not least because of the calling into play of high-standing scientific discourses. Think 
tanks that have established an adviser role tend to keep a distance to other types of ways 
of to affect climate politics. However, a distinct field of action also exists among the 
interviewees, which interestingly combines vigorous research with outsider strategies 
embracing a watchdog-role. Not all research appears to be advisory-motivated; instead 
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of providing information for the state, another division of research is conducted with an 
activist inclination, that is to say, in order to support pressuring governments.  
4.4 Mitigation strategies 
Mitigation – the reduction of GHG emissions, be it through cutting energy consumption 
or coming up with more effective ways to use it – is the only way to curb climate 
change. CSOs’ mitigation-oriented activities take many forms and target multiple 
actors. Levels of mitigation work mentioned by the interviewed CSOs vary between 
pushing for emissions reduction at the state level via policies, legislature, and public 
expenditure, mitigation pressure towards businesses or cooperation with them in this 
aim, and promoting and developing citizens’ sustainable choices. 
Regarding the first, CSOs can demand the government to make efforts to reduce GHG 
emissions within the country. CSOs are also known to monitor state compliance with 
international agreements and critically observe the implication of protocols 
(Gulbrandsen & Andresen 2004). The watch-dog function can be exercised either 
nationally or internationally. It seems that in India, civil society groups’ activities 
concentrate less on mitigation pressure towards their own government. They generally 
direct their complaints about non-compliance to international agreements rather at 
Annex 1 countries, as mitigation is still widely seen as mainly the responsibility of rich 
countries. It is more common among civil society groups to concentrate on other issues 
in advocacy work targeting their own government: interviews convey the view that 
national policy debate is concentrated on combining developmental and environmental 
policies, as well as more recently on integrating adaptation capacities to governmental 
policy-making. Indian CSOs face the challenge of balancing national development 
priorities and international mitigation aspirations (Damodaran 2010, 286–287). 
However, CSOs have lately begun to impose some pressure on the Indian government 
to introduce domestic mitigation efforts:  
“India was basically going to go down the adaption route, not necessarily 
a mitigation policy. […] in terms of mitigation, India's position was 
largely that of common but differentiated responsibilities, which is that we 
did not cause the problem, let the developed world act and then we will 
see what we have to do. And we were basically making the case that 
there is no way India can adapt to the impacts of climate change. And 
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therefore India had to ensure that the rest of the world acted and in that 
possibly India would also have to take some concrete steps […] to 
address climate change.” (I13) 
Civil society voices have been the first to make the point in India that action should be 
taken on climate change in developing countries, too, because effects of runaway 
climate change would be devastating nationally – especially for the poor. In this quote 
domestic steps are however also seen as a way to compel other countries to make 
commitments as well.  
As for the second level of pressure, mitigation related advocacy typically strives for 
emission reductions through government regulation, which in turn may encourage low-
carbon businesses. Research from other contexts has detected civil society directly 
targeting corporations with the demand to reduce emissions (e.g. Newell 2008). 
However, this aspect of advocacy work is not very pronounced among the interviewed 
organizations. The finding contrasts with the strategies of previous Indian 
environmental movements and their clashes with for example extractive companies (see 
e.g. Karan 1994). Many interviewees complain about inaction on the part of the 
corporate sector, but, almost without exception, they do not report much work in this 
side. They state that businesses will not cut their emissions out of good will, and thus, 
there is a need for legislation to limit the liberty to emit, as well as incentive 
mechanisms to encourage more climate-friendly forms and objects of trade. CSOs’ 
direct lobbying towards businesses is not as common as in some other countries, 
apparently since they feel that influence possibilities in this course of action are low; it 
is better to try and influence the private sector via the state. This strategy is found more 
sensible since “wherever you find robust green technology business happening […] you 
will find […] that government has actually played a very huge role” (I11). 
Third, some of the interviewed organizations’ mitigation pursuits consist of promoting 
grassroots efforts to sustainable livelihoods, or creating and supporting innovative 
alternative development models to be implemented on a local level. Quite a few 
organizations favor “the route of small solutions” (I13) as a pathway to energy 
efficiency and sustainability. Gradual small-scale reduction of emissions can also be 
promoted through campaigns to lower individual energy use. Outreach campaigns aim 
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to “--literate people on how they should be […] careful of using energy and all kinds of 
world resources” (I1). These efforts bear resemblance to low-carbon lifestyle 
campaigning affiliated with the de-growth movement in more affluent countries (e.g. 
Urry 2011). Anyhow, in countries less “well-off”, the emphasis is more on alternative 
visions of development: attempting to decouple development and carbon-intensive 
growth. Although re-conceptualizing ideas such as development is a contested process, 
this course of action with a grassroots focus seems to be by choice “apolitical” among 
the interviewed organizations opting for it. They see it as a chance to distance 
themselves from climate “politics”, and concentrate on local solutions. “The COP 
process itself, I find it – we find [is a] waste of time for people like us, because we are 
more of action-oriented people on the ground”, one interviewee expresses (I3).  
Apart from innovating and disseminating new low-carbon technologies in the 
grassroots, a considerable section of the organizations promote local, endemic solutions 
to climate change. These interviewees talk about retaining and spreading existing 
sustainable rural livelihoods. Brand et al. (2009, 11) note that due to managerial framing 
and technocratic discourses, “the many local, practical alternatives – more precisely, 
existing low-carbon lifestyles – to be found, are downplayed. Moreover, a number of 
ecologically sustainable forms of producing and living have actually been put under 
pressure not only by globalized capitalism, but more specifically, by a top-down kind of 
climate politics.” Many of the interviewed CSOs emphasize the merit of traditional 
Indian livelihoods in restraining emissions. 
Reduction of emissions is in a sense the ultimate cross-cutting aim in all climate change 
work. It can be attempted through all of the hitherto itemized types of action. Some 
organizations state the direct objective of reducing GHG emissions by pushing for the 
use of renewable energy sources (advocacy). The most straightforward way that some 
of the interviewed organizations strive towards emission-reductions is by coming up 
with new mitigation initiatives (research). Informing and encouraging people to adopt 
more sustainable habits can advance mitigation efforts as well (awareness-raising). But 
interestingly, mitigation is in fact not at the heart of the climate change discussion in 
India based on the content of the interviews. The main concerns of the CSO workers are 
centered on other themes, such as equity, survival, or adaptation. At the same time, a 
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group of organizations represent a technical attitude to climate change, one focused on 
activities such as mitigation, adaptation, and research from a scientific perspective. This 
approach is often attached to a form of planning-oriented argumentation and values 
presented within it (see section 5.6). 
4.5 Adaptation support 
Finally, there is already a high level of concentration on adaptation work among Indian 
CSOs. In contrast with many of the developed countries most vocal in global climate 
governance, climate change is already manifesting in India. Hence, adaptation issues are 
central to the agenda of a large number of organizations operating in India. Facilitating 
adaptation to a changing climate includes working at the grassroots and trying to find 
local solutions to cope with new circumstances and protect livelihoods at risk. 
Adaptation involves both concrete actions and trying to feed into “the debate on what 
climate change adaptation is and what it should be” (I4a). 
The estimated effects of climate change in India range from temperature changes and 
shifts in the patterns of monsoon rains to increased extreme weather events such as heat 
waves, droughts, cyclones, and floods. Its low-lying and extremely densely populated 
7000-kilometer-long coastline makes India one of the countries most vulnerable to 
climate change. If sea levels rise due to climate change, taking over land and decreasing 
fresh water supply, India’s coastal areas have been estimated to be among some of the 
most affected areas globally. The projected retreat of Himalayan glaciers in turn will 
bear heavily on drinking water supply and irrigation, and threaten local livelihoods due 
to erosion, rising tree line and declining biodiversity. The major river systems of the 
sub-continent originate in the Himalayas, which means that their melting will also have 
an enormous effect on the 400 million people living in the Ganges river delta. As a 
primarily agrarian society, India is especially vulnerable to these effects of climate 
change. The large rural population – 70 percent of citizenry – is dependent on climate-
sensitive sectors like agriculture and forestry. Cultivation relies on the increasingly 
unstable periodic monsoons, which are also pivotal in sustaining various other 
economic, societal and environmental systems in the country. Adverse effects on forest 
ecosystems in turn entail loss of subsistence for tribal communities. Climate change 
poses new challenges to food security in India, and the economically weaker sections of 
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the population are hit hardest. (Dash 2007, 96–129, 142; Dash 2010; Government of 
India 2012, 10, 95–96; Hasnain & Tayal 2010; Joshi & Sirohi 2010; Srinivasan 2012, 
32–34; Tenhunen & Säävälä 2007, 226–227.) 
Even after this concise outlook, it is obvious that climate change is most likely to hold 
serious implications for India and its people, and as the interviewees say, is already a 
question of adaptation. The above described issues are what organizations working with 
grassroots adaptation strive to deal with. High population density combined with low 
per capita incomes exacerbate the dangers posed by the natural phenomenon. The 
interviewees stress that the poorest, who have contributed least to the problem, are in 
many cases both those most affected by it and those with least adaptive capacities to 
rely on. These are the people who are most in need of adaptation strategies and support. 
The interviewees often discern the contrast between contributing to climate change and 
vulnerability to it as a basis for vocalizing the injustice they observe in climate change. 
As will be specified in the coming chapters, these natural phenomena, and facts of the 
concrete implication to affected people’s lives, can act as material “proof” for 
justifications behind the arguments that the civil society actors advance. For instance 
when presenting civic qualifications, the amount of people displaced by climate change 
and the material distress they face provide legitimate grounds for solidarity. Moreover, 
numbers are often appreciated in official decision-making contexts, and can thus feed 
into advocacy work.  
Mobilization of victims of environmental crises has for long been an important part of 
environmental movements’ strategies in India (Gadgil and Guha 1994). However, it 
seems that mobilization is not used to the same extent as a mode of operation in climate 
change action. Some efforts to mobilize sufferers of climate change have taken place. 
An example are the national people’s tribunals on climate change arranged by civil 
society groups. In a tribunal, people have the opportunity to provide testimonies on 
“how they are being impacted and how their livelihoods have been impacted” (I7), 
bringing their personal experiences of climate change into a public forum. The goal is to 
press those responsible for continuing emissions and accelerating climate change to act.  
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Thévenot (2007, 420) notes how in recently opened spaces of public debate, what is 
now required is testimony of familiar experiences. However, this kind of evidence “does 
not lend itself immediately to a public format” (ibid.). What makes sense within the 
regime of familiar engagement might not be relevant in more public regimes. Indeed, it 
seems that everyday experiences need to be converted into the valid currency of 
publicly justifiable arguments, most notably as proof for them. However, there is a 
danger of these efforts proving oppressive for persons lending their experiences in 
spaces not receptive to the familiar format (ibid.). The domain of decision-making on 
climate change only recognizes the regimes of public justification and that of 
engagement in a plan. Familiarity, as the “most personalized relation of caring for the 
world” is “hard to integrate with engagements that are more prepared for 
communication” (Thévenot 2011b, 49). Arguably, CSOs that articulate grassroots 
concerns on climate change may facilitate this process as they mediate between 
contrasting regimes, acting as “professional intermediaries” (cf. ibid., 58–59).  
*** 
In this chapter, I have gone through the interviewed CSOs’ main activities and how they 
are entwined. The above covered five separate but interconnected ways to work on 
climate change can be named. Each organization commonly concentrates more on a few 
categories of action instead of engaging in all of them. To conclude the chapter, I will 
reflect on the choice of action of CSOs. 
Gough and Shackley (2001, 336–339) present an alternate distinction of three broad 
categories of activities that CSOs are engaged in in climate politics: developing creative 
policy solutions, knowledge construction, and lobbying and campaigning. This 
itemization encompasses research and advocacy, but it should be noted that beyond 
more explicitly political participation, concrete actions and grassroots solutions 
(especially concerning mitigation and adaptation) are also an important part of CSOs 
climate change work in India. As another example, the most important activities 
identified in CSOs’ climate change work in the UK and Australia are election 
campaigns, involvement in policy-making, and grassroots awareness-raising and 
community action (Hall & Taplin 2007, 326–333). Interestingly, in the Indian context 
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election campaigning is non-existent, but this list needs to be completed with a 
specification of community-level work, as well as the addition of actions more inclined 
to outsider strategies into the policy influence efforts. 
Many different factors may help explain a CSO’s selected modes of operation. At an 
organizational level, the premises of the organization affect its orientation and vice 
versa. Quite understandably, the financial, political and intellectual resources that an 
organization has at its disposal directly affect the types of strategies it chooses and the 
arenas it targets (Gulbrandsen & Andresen 2004, 58). Some of the interviewed 
organizations count with a considerable amount of policy influence capacity due to the 
connections they possess, while others are much better in touch with local communities 
and by that virtue hold representative advantages. There are also obvious differentiated 
abilities to participate directly on international arenas. As has been observed, limited 
access to funds all but excludes many actors from these possibilities (Unmüssig 2011, 
5). The fact that climate change is already affecting Indian people clearly urges CSOs to 
work with adaptation, in addition to the pull factor of newly established funding for 
adaptation work.  
CSOs working with climate change issues are embedded in the political and policy 
contexts of their country (Hall & Taplin 2007). In India, it seems like there is a need for 
civil society to take on an advisor role to support the government. This induces a split in 
the civil society field regarding designated field of action. Oommen (2004, 15) 
conceptualizes the division of labor among Indian CSOs by three groups: ones with a 
techno-managerial role, reformist ones involved in conscientization, and more radically 
transformational ones that mobilize the deprived sections of society into collective 
action. These profiles can also be recognized in CSOs working on climate change. 
Particularly, organizations with a technical orientation that embrace an advisory role to 
support policy-making stand apart from organizations working for change. 
The field of action of CSOs affects their stance and the arguments they advance. A 
connection can be traced between the here discussed acts, and views, which are the 
topic of the next chapter. For one, concentration on certain issues on a daily basis quite 
obviously correlates with being concerned specifically with its thematics. On the other 
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hand, the operating field also dictates the explicitly usable repertoire of speech. Because 
of the continuing developmental challenges present in India, most of the CSOs work 
with so-called development issues from the offset. This has implications for the 
organizations’ entry point into the climate discussion. 
The CSOs’ climate change work may operate within different justifications worlds or 
regimes of engagement. Within the familiar regime, level of comfort is the measure of 
usefulness of an action; in the regime of engagement in a plan, actions are functional 
and hold instrumental potential regarding the plan. When seeking public legitimacy, 
actions are evaluated within the order of worth applied. The interviews imply that CSOs 
action may also take place between regimes. Some of their endeavors essentially 
involve mediating familiar and public experiences and occurrences.  
Besides the moral stands present in the arguments that the actors put forward in the 
context of each of the activities the CSOs pursue, the actions themselves qualify as 
worthy within distinct justification worlds. This line of thought allows for recognizing 
the relationship between the moral principles the argumentators advance and courses of 
action that they think highly of in the same context. When in the public justification 
mode, democratic endeavors, awareness-raising, mobilization, and alleviating the 
distress of affected people qualify as actions acquiring civic worth, while research and 
scientific solutions to mitigation and adaptation qualify for industrial worth. To a certain 
degree, such a division corresponds to a block of industrial-oriented organizations and 
civic-oriented ones in the climate change field. These can be linked to techno-
managerial (Oommen 2004) or advisory (Gulbrandsen & Andresen 2004) organizations 
on one side and reformist and transformational (Oommen 2004) or activist 
(Gulbrandsen & Andresen 2004) ones on the other.  
This chapter analyzed the CSOs’ action forms and their Indian specificities. 
Explanations identified for these specificities include features of geography, economy 
and structures of the media and governance systems. The chapter also hinted on an 
interesting juxtaposition of forms of worth, which can be noted in both the actions and 
arguments of the Indian CSOs. The next chapter goes on to classify in a more detailed 
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manner the interviewed CSO actors’ arguments, most of which essentially operate in 
regime of public justification. 
5 Arguments and justifications 
Apart from more concrete actions, civil society can have a prominent role in shaping 
definitions of the problem of climate change. In this chapter, I analyze the types of 
arguments that the civil society representatives present related to their advocacy work 
through a classification of claims and justifications made by the interviewees regarding 
climate change. The main views put forward by the interviewed civil society actors are 
classified under six families of arguments: ones calling for some form of “climate 
justice”, concerns regarding a democratic climate policy-making process, claims giving 
primacy to livelihoods and grassroots sustainability; referrals to a traditional human-
nature relationship in India; argumentation discarding climate change as a secondary or 
even irrelevant issue for India or the people represented by the civil society group; and 
lastly, emphasis on effective planning and science-based expert solutions to climate 
change. To conclude the chapter, I compare the arguments and justifications commonly 
stated by the CSO actors to the moral logics of official India and of international actors, 
and sketch out the elements of a prevalent form of argumentation among Indian CSOs, 
which can be described as inspired justice environmentalism. 
5.1 Climate justice 
 “--we are not asking for the right to pollute, we are asking for a right 
 to develop. [… ] While we are saying that […] we don't want to develop 
 the way the West has developed and contributed so much of emissions in 
 the atmosphere, […] we have to realize how much poverty is there in the 
 country and what are our limitations – which are huge.” (I4a) 
The climate justice discussion refers to debates about the unequal distribution of effects 
of and responsibility for climate change. At the heart of the climate justice concept is 
the observation that the poorest countries and people are those who will suffer first and 
most from climate change, even though they have contributed least to the problem itself 
(Watkins 2007, 1). Claims demanding climate justice are concerned with the unequal 
“distribution of benefits and costs of climate change” (I5). The core question is how this 
distribution should be managed in pursuit of an equitable outcome.  
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Demands for justice come up repeatedly in the morally loaded statements made by the 
interviewees. Arguments demanding environmental justice point to the recognition of 
ecological debt (Srinivasan et al. 2008). While some countries have primarily initiated 
climate change, a different set of countries are most likely to suffer its impact. Rich 
countries must bear responsibility for their lion’s share of emissions; it is simply not fair 
to try to prevent developing countries emissions when they have urgent problems with 
acute poverty. Rich countries should thus act first in addressing the transnational threat. 
Many interviewees claim that everyone should have access to the global commons, 
since the atmosphere and global environmental resources are “not particular to anyone” 
(I1). Many interviewees express concern for the hypocrisy of Northern countries in 
global climate governance. The inherent contradiction in comments coming from rich 
countries is illustrated by the following quote:  
 “Roughly three billion to four billion people don’t have dignified 
developed existence, so what about them? And basically, you cannot 
have your own consumption level at that high level and talk about 
these people somehow as to be able to stabilize the [climate], it cannot 
be done. So those debates are also very important because somehow these 
international things are not being discussed, plastered into some kind of 
policies somewhere.” (I8) 
The interviewees proclaim that inequity is the overriding problem regarding climate 
change and ought to be central in policies, plans and statements. The above described 
arguments make reference to the general principles of solidarity, justice and equity to 
justify their claim. They can be analytically categorized to the civic mode of 
justification. Civic criteria of justification evaluate action on the basis of whether or not 
it reduces inequality (Lamont & Thévenot 2000, 14). This theoretical distinction allows 
for recognizing and specifying the moral construction of argumentative positions and 
distinguishing their basic premises. Although a sense of planetary urgency is present 
when talking about climate change, it does not form relevant proof within the civic 
mode of justification. What is of importance is that justice be done. In civic 
justifications, material proof can be provided for example in the form of number of 
people living in poverty, as in the quote above.  
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As a term, climate justice is not fixed, and speakers may mean different things when 
referring to it. Typically definitions of climate justice include elements of environmental 
and social justice. The concept of climate justice was first enunciated at the 2002 UN 
World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in Johannesburg, where an 
international coalition of groups released a set of principles aimed at “putting a human 
face” on climate change. The principles attempted to redefine climate change from a 
human rights and environmental justice perspective. An international civil society 
movement on climate justice emerged at COP 14 in Bali in 2007, bringing about 
remarkable bridge-building between environmental and development CSOs. (Goodman 
2009; India Resources Centre 2002.) As Newell (2008, 128) observes, climate justice 
issues have become an increasingly salient feature of inter-state climate change 
negotiations. In addition to issues of historical responsibility, the duty to support 
adaptation and compensate communities that find themselves in the front line of climate 
change, but have contributed little to the problem, has entered the discussion. In other 
words, justice claims can be vocalized in relation to, for one, the historical 
responsibility for climate change and allocating burden-sharing in fighting it 
accordingly, and second, the “forgotten responsibilities of adaptation” (Parikh & Parikh 
2011, 219), which should be taken into account in a fair deal. 
Arguments bringing up equity concerns come up in virtually all interviews. Especially 
organizations working primarily with advocacy or awareness-raising, generally more 
political in their stands, root for equity claims. Equity principles in some sense are 
however subscribed to by virtually all Indian CSOs; variation can be found in their 
interpretation and operationalization. Like the climate justice concept, the wider 
principle of equity in climate change is understood in various ways (see e.g. Rao 2012). 
Equity proposals lead to some sense of fairness in distribution of mitigation efforts or 
corrective justice for its damages. Some of the CSOs practically support India’s official 
stance building on equity – and a few have actually contributed to creating it, as was 
shown in the previous chapter. The official view entails demands for a fair share of 
atmospheric resources on a per capita basis along with references to CBDR. These can 
be connected to both of the main lines in equity thinking and calculations: fair 
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distribution of environmental resources, specifically the planet’s carbon absorption 
capacity, and of emission reductions as a cost (ibid., 147).  
While global equity concerns are widely accepted among the Indian civil society, where 
the respondents’ answers differ is the question of internal equity. Sub-national justice 
claims arise from the material as a novel element, advocated by Indian civil society 
actors. This is an interesting finding within the Indian climate debate. National divides 
in energy consumption due to the steep stratification of Indian society, particularly the 
burgeoning emissions of the elite and middle class, give reason to point out that solely 
“India’s consuming class [is] responsible for most of its emissions” (I13). When it 
comes to differentiation between countries in bearing responsibility, some definition of 
climate justice is supported by most climate change actors in India. Justice within the 
country is called for by certain CSOs and included in many of the civil society 
representatives’ claims, but virtually ignored by state actors and absent in the official 
understanding of climate justice: 
“So on one hand the ministry here in India are talking about equity, 
[…] but equity only between nations.” (I8) 
 “--while being found in the international debates fighting for climate 
 justice, India should also take up local action, internal action, to make 
 sure that the rich, poor – the climate justice happens within the 
 country.” (I3) 
 “I think climate justice […] certainly is something that one should fight 
 for – until you actually understand the implications, and we actually 
 understand that there is a global consuming class in the world that's 
 across the borders. It's not divided by nations. Until we actually see 
 climate justice in that frame, we are not going to get solutions.” (I13) 
These comments highlight the “responsibility of the global rich to the global poor” 
(I13), not only that of rich countries to poor countries. The rich within India pertain to 
this global consuming class. The logic of revealing this injustice operates in a way that a 
“test” within the civic world reveals the presence of intra-country inequity in actions 
and statements apparently grounded on values of equity. A further dispute within the 
civic world then exists on whether sub-national justice should be included in the climate 
justice frame or not. 
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This level of critique suggests that global climate justice references can potentially 
justify “hiding behind the poor” (Ananthapadmanabhan et al. 2007). A Greenpeace 
report by this name has raised discussion within the civil society on the adequacy of the 
Indian state’s actions in the combat against climate change. It calculates that although 
national emissions are low compared to population size, an Indian pertaining to the 1 
percent in the highest income group emits 4.5 times more CO2 than a citizen within the 
poorest 38 percent of the population (ibid.). Climate justice turns into an absurd plea, if 
it is used as grounds to allow countries like India to go on polluting while posing its 
own people at risk – not to mention for instance small island states at threat of 
disappearing. An interviewee raises this point by remarking: “how can India say we will 
not take responsibility when you know entire nations are going to be destroyed?” (I13).  
Some interviewees seem to denounce the government’s equity claims as “false 
arguments” that claim to reside within the equity framework, and thus the civic world. 
They maintain that here, justice acts merely as a cover-up for domestic public interests 
or behavior that can be attributed to the regime of engagement in a plan. These are in 
turn denounced by invoking understandings of the common good combining civic and 
ecological principles. This counter-argument exposes hidden interest politics and a 
strategic (and as such inferior) use of civic justifications due to their widespread 
legitimacy in various contexts, which makes international equity a convenient frame for 
the Indian government to articulate its negotiating position. In other words, “strategic” 
civic justifications may allow for inaction on the part of the Indian government in 
cutting emissions. 
Others do not favor speaking of climate justice in the context of internal affairs. They do 
not recognize differences in emissions profiles as questions of climate justice and would 
prefer to exclude these aspects from national climate politics: 
 “I would personally say that one needs to make a distinction 
 between climate justice and justice otherwise. […] it is not really a 
 good idea conceptually to think of climate justice at the national 
 level.” (I5) 
The interviewee rationalizes that as national policy questions, other types of justice are 
more apposite. He suggests that within a country, welfare or economic justice are 
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primary, and environmental justice secondary; on the international level the case is 
contrary, since every country’s emissions affect others as well. Generally it seems that 
internal justice arguments raise anxiety in India since they might in turn be taken 
advantage of by developed countries to help divert attention from lack of successful 
mitigation on their part (Chakravarty & Ramana 2012, 226–227). 
Climate justice as a widely known concept provides a convenient frame for arguments. 
As such, it is useful for the CSO representatives to articulate their concerns. On the 
other hand, some of them seem to reject it precisely because of the ready-made 
connotations it carries, and try to distance themselves from the climate justice discourse 
and frame their arguments differently in order to be perceived as more “rational” actors. 
The interviews insinuate that argumentation involving exact figures and scientific 
grounding (discussed in section 5.6) succors in being taken seriously in high-level 
policy-debates on climate change. 
5.2 Democratic process 
Procedural justice is a concern that comes up in various contexts. Interviewees voice 
calls for a democratic process in climate politics, either nationally or at the international 
level. At the country level, democratic claims demand consultative processes for the 
formulation of climate change policies, such as action plans. On the international level, 
invoking democratic principles brings in the idea that all countries should have equal 
say in global climate governance. Many of the interviewed grassroots organizations 
demand inclusion, either of countries or of affected people, in order to enhance 
accountability and representation in climate policy-making.  
When posing arguments this way, the focus is on the political process. The inclusion of 
all levels of the population in the climate change discussions is seen as crucial; this is 
also a central goal of many of the organizations’ climate change related activities, as 
was discussed in the previous chapter. A need for “democratic action” (I8) is behind 
many of the organizations’ different undertakings concerning climate change. These 
often involve awareness-raising to mobilize people to start participating in climate 
change issues. From the point of view of the civil society, hitherto official actions have 
been to a too great extent state-drawn and short of inclusive processes. As one 
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interviewee put it: “one major aim is to democratize this process, […] it should be 
brought out in the public domain, people should participate” (I8). 
One problem brought up by the interviewees is that national plans are all made in 
English. This obviously has a tremendous effect on possibilities for public participation 
in the climate debate. Although English is an official language in India, its command 
follows the lines of economic and cultural wealth. As an effort to intervene, certain 
CSOs are translating official announcements into local languages and summarizing 
them into handouts of a comprehensible length in order to allow for opinion formation 
on a grassroots level. Even these efforts of course exclude the illiterate, who form a 
considerable part of rural population in India. 
The argumentation calling for democratization of the negotiation or policy-making 
processes can be extended to democratic quality within civil society itself. One 
interviewee brings up how also “within the movement, there’s the struggle to be 
horizontal, to be more democratic” both within India and internationally; he also voices 
the concern of many Southern activists that “the whole discourse is generally dominated 
by Northern NGOs and Northern activists” (I6). These pleas link with questions of 
internal representation within CSOs themselves (cf. Dombrowski 2010, 399–402). 
Within the context of democracy speech, the organizations’ climate change work takes 
on importance primarily because civil society should be involved in climate policy-
making processes and international negotiations in order to bring forwards the voice of 
the affected people. The imperative to participate in climate change advocacy is seen 
almost as a civic duty: CSO representatives should observe and take part in climate 
change decision-making so that no harmful decisions are done: 
“--in the UN process more and more people like us are losing faith […] 
 because […] corporate interests and governments are more or less singing 
 the same tune. But the problem of abandoning that is that if you abandon 
 that, if you don’t interact, if you don’t object, if you don’t challenge, 
 then the wrong things that are being done, the policies and the plans, 
 these will increase – because there will be no resistance.” (I8). 
 “--I wanted to work on an issue where I am giving voice to those who 
 really don’t have a voice, so to say. And I think there are enough number 
 of people out there who are being affected by climate change, they 
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 might not even maybe recognize it as climate change but you know, their 
 livelihoods are compromised, you know, there is all kinds of difficulties 
 and survival issues […]” (I4b) 
This type of argumentation represents a civic rationalization that stresses the idea of 
solidarity and participation to reach a commonly defined good. “Duty” to act on climate 
change extends from representing the voiceless or powerless of today to representing 
future generations that are not here to speak for themselves. It can be exercised either as 
a representative of the general “people”, or as a citizen of the globe. The latter is 
elaborated in a common argument for urging climate action, stating that “global 
citizens” should care for the “global commons”:  
 “--the reason [for fighting against climate change is that] environment is 
 something that should concern us all.” (I12).  
 “It's really a very important issue, as a citizen of not India but as a citizen 
 of the whole this globe, as a global citizen, you can – because environment 
 is, the whole environment is not particular to any person or any country, 
 you know – so we, I mean, we, as a citizen, should take this initiative 
 and we should do something […]” (I1) 
The main value behind the above described arguments is democracy, with justifications 
grounded on inclusive and participatory qualifications. Demands for democratization 
gain their legitimacy from the civic mode of justification. The most important civic 
justifications found in this study can thus be analytically divided into democracy claims 
and equity claims. Luhtakallio and Ylä-Anttila (2011) have also identified an internal 
division of the civic mode of justification, separating justice, democratic and legal 
currents within the use of civic principles. Legalistic back-up is not substantially present 
in the material at hand,
14
 but a distinction between democracy and justice as equity is 
useful for the conceptual separation of moral stands referring to distributive and 
procedural justice within the climate discussion. It helps make sense of the wide myriad 
of civic arguments among Indian civil society representatives.  
The use of democratic justifications is facilitated by their widespread legitimacy, and, 
without analytically distinguishing between the two aspects, a generalized sense of 
importance. In India, a democratic tradition has evolved not only since independence as 
                                                 
14
 This type of justification mainly comes up when referring to the rules of the convention (UNFCCC) 
being broken by Annex 1 countries. 
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adopted from the West, but is rooted in a tradition of multi-toned public debate and 
reasoning (Sen 2007[2005]).  Generally, Indians are deeply committed to democratic 
ideals, although democracy does admittedly have substantive operative challenges in the 
country. The long democratic tradition makes claims to democracy widely legitimate. 
(Parekh 2006, 448.) Mentions of supporting democracy also please international donors 
who fund a wide range of CSO’s work in India. And, as it is, in India the “organizations 
are majorly dependent on funding from outside” (I1). When discussing motives of civil 
society for promoting and invoking participation, this aspect of appealing to global 
funders cannot be left unnoticed. Democratic qualifications are embraced (and, widely 
legitimate) both in Indian political culture and in the culture of the world polity.  
Organizations with a grassroots base commonly make reference to democracy in their 
claims. Despite their frequency, democratic justifications are not quite as widespread as 
the climate justice discourse. CSOs’ interest in especially awareness-raising work seems 
to correlate with democratic justifications. These organizations think highly of the right 
to participate in issues that affect the people, and tend to consider democracy as a value 
in itself (as opposed to merely of instrumental value). Advocacy organizations, in turn, 
favor democratization of processes particularly in conjunction with a view that a 
democratic process will bring about better policies. Organizations in favor of technical 
approach do not speak so much of participation, leaving aside the question of whether it 
might result in more effective mitigation or adaptation.  
Arguments described in this section denounce actions that do not take the democratic 
quality of processes into consideration. From the perspective of civic worth, especially 
acts operating within the regime of engagement in a plan seem to be condemned from a 
normative standpoint. Arguments making reference to democratic principles voice 
suspicions of deviation from the common good in the international process. For 
example, interest politics are denounced on civic grounds when stating that measures 
should be taken to ensure that the rights of the poor are not lost in “dirty politics” (I4b). 
From their position as representatives of public interest (cf. Lisowski 2005), CSOs 
condemn political, imperialistic, or power-motivated endeavors. Qualms of a hidden 
agenda in global climate politics are a common suspicion in developing countries. A 
generalized underlying doubt exists on whether the “relatively sudden prominence of 
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the issue in international politics is ‘really because of the climate crisis’” (Brand et al. 
2009, 9). In particular, postcolonial strands of thinking that have assessed global power 
relations (Bhambra 2007; Chakrabarty 2000; Spivak 1988) seem to be reflected in 
interpretation of international climate politics in India. 
5.3 Primacy of livelihoods 
In India, as in many other corners of the world, more and more issues are being 
identified as climate change related. Due to raised awareness on the phenomenon, 
occurrences in the environment, as well as their effects on people, are increasingly 
linked to global changes in the climate. Indeed, climate change is truly “such a cross-
cutting issue” (I10), with interlinkages in many directions. Also, different issues begin 
to be framed as climate change issues – as adaptation issues, mitigation issues, or 
climate justice issues, for example – as this linkage becomes more widely recognized 
and readily available. An interviewee illustrates this by describing how for instance 
agriculture, water, or forestry projects are “tagged down” and “being called climate 
change adaptation in some sense” (I4b).  
This is not to say that the subjects are not in fact attached to the phenomenon. But it 
must also be noted that apart from new realizations on the underlying causes of 
problems and the interconnectedness of issues, mentioning climate change is also 
convenient: it eases finding finance and reaching visibility. The material under study 
indicates some CSOs making use of the “climate change train” as a way to forwarding 
other goals. For example protection of traditional livelihoods can be advanced under the 
title of sustainability or low-carbon production. The following quote shows how rural 
livelihoods are seen as an answer to urgent problems related to poverty and 
malnourishment; actually they just happen to be ecological livelihoods, as well: 
 “India is the number one malnourished country in the world. They need to 
 promote a rural economy which doesn’t push people out of the village 
 but keeps them in the village, and that promotes their lifestyle – which is 
 actually more environmental.” (I6) 
The organization campaigns to save rural livelihoods, and make use of an 
environmental perspective while doing so. Ecology is invoked in defense of traditional 
lifestyles. Tapping into the climate change debate can be an aid in this: climate change 
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as a unifying frame for a wide range of issues can help gain legitimacy for claims. 
Rather than a value in itself, the ecological quality of a lifestyle thus acts as a strategic 
justification for promoting it in a modern society. So, the climate crisis might actually 
be used as an ecological justification for other than climate change related goals: 
  “Well I think […] the climate crisis is actually an opportunity to 
 promote food sovereignty, because food sovereignty is the solution. 
 Climate change from the agricultural point of view, so, it’s also a way for 
 us to oppose industrial agriculture which causes climate change.” (I6) 
The interviewee refers to a community-centered interpretation of food sovereignty, 
which stresses peoples’ right to healthy, ecological, and culturally appropriate food, 
produced locally through agricultural systems defined by the communities themselves 
(Ylä-Anttila 2010a, 187–188). Food sovereignty is presented here as a goal in itself as 
well as a solution for confining emissions. Climate change has been included as one of 
the central issues of the agenda for the reason that its concrete and policy effects are 
affecting farmers. The impact of climate change is felt by destitute agricultural workers, 
whose survival depends on their annual yield.  
Sustainable livelihoods help fight climate change by virtue of restricting emissions. 
However, the traditional rural lifestyle is considered primarily desirable because of 
other attributes than its ecological worth. Statements place overarching concern with the 
rights and protection of the “man on the ground”; the “poor guy” or “rural folks”. They 
are the first to suffer, as “climate change is impacting the livelihoods of the people” 
(I2). In this context, climate change is often conceived of as a rights-issue, and decent 
livelihoods are considered “a right for every citizen of this world” (I11). The evoked 
common good consists of solidarity for and protection of common people in the face of 
climate change, pointing to civic qualifications. What is of essence here is, again, 
equity. The addressed acute humanitarian question surmounts any environmental 
concerns, only conceivable in the long term. Domestic qualifications can also be traced 
behind the arguments, if the age-old modes of rural existence are valued specifically 
because of their traditionalism. This represents an appreciation of domestic values.  
Claims referring primarily to a green worth are not as prevalent in the material as one 
might assume. Ecological concerns are mentioned every now and then to provide some 
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sort of evidence of a need for action, but in fact the deeper justifications for the stance 
taken are more of a civic kind. Under systematical analysis, justifications found in 
climate change related claims in the data at hand do not very often make reference to the 
world of ecology. The existence of ecology as an independent worth is debated among 
sociologists interested in justification processes. In practice, a green worth is 
controversial not least because it would extend the range of common good beyond 
humans. If indeed such a move does not take place, references to it can quite 
consistently be reduced to other orders of worth. Claims referring to a green worth are 
often ecological concerns only on the surface. They may actually contain domestic 
valuing of a traditional home region, concerns that can be classified as industrial, or 
civic values. (Latour 2003, 81–85, 97.) The paradoxical aspect of increasing 
environmental talk is that despite their apparent novelty, ecological justifications often 
serve merely as a cover for other – human – interests (Lafaye & Thévenot 1993). 
On the other hand, it has been suggested that regarding climate change argumentation in 
the media, the lack of ecological justifications might also reflect that consensus has been 
reached on the necessity of environmental protection within the climate debate and the 
focus of the discussion has moved on to the “next level”, to the ways that climate 
change could be fought (Huikuri 2011, 63). Although this may well reflect the situation 
on an international level, on ground pitch in India this is hardly the case when it comes 
to most arguments. 
5.4 Traditional human-nature relationship 
I have insinuated that purely ecological justifications are not as of yet common in the 
Indian climate discussion, but implied that environmental values might be dismounting 
in the country due to global diffusion processes and perhaps the spread of 
environmentalism among the global civil society. Some, in contrast, would argue that 
environmentalism is not in fact a nascent value in the context of India, but is instead 
deeply integrated into the Indian cultural tradition. The interviewees occasionally 
enforce their positions on climate change with statements bringing up a traditionally 
internalized sense of holiness of the nature, illustrated in the following quotes: 
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 “India, apart from being multicultural, is a multi-religious society […]
 and almost all religions, interestingly, they talk about climate. They talk 
 about being meticulous in terms of […] exploiting resources […] and it 
 will help, in fact, the consumerism culture […] [Being] aware of these 
 issues, they will relate it with the religion […]” (I1) 
 “India is a country which is largely religion-oriented, and in […] any 
 religion, the – in our culture the respect for nature and respect for our 
 planet are the soul, heart. (I2) 
Religious representation of the environment is common in Indian culture, and the large 
amount of subsistence livelihoods in India make the relationship to nature particularly 
essential (Brara 2003). Although asserted less forcefully than the previous arguments, 
the human-nature relationship is mentioned strikingly widely among the interviewees. 
When nature is invoked on the outset, one might assume the presence of a green mode 
of justification. But with climate change claims in the Indian context, the justifications 
utilized by the interviewees appear to not be purely ecological in essence. Their speech 
makes references to a time-honored human symbiosis with nature of the peoples of 
India. The arguments describe an environmental-minded traditionalism approximating a 
religious ethos in its quest for harmony with nature. The motives for caring for the 
environment in these arguments are compliance to tradition, acquiring domestic worth, 
or cuasi-religious grounds, indicating the higher principle of inspiration. However, 
emotional attachment to nature might not always take the form of public justifications; 
interviewees also speak of traditional respect for nature as a form of co-existence, best 
conceptualized within the regime of familiar bonds. 
An inspired worth is present for instance in interviewees’ referrals to Earth as a Mother, 
and humans and nature as one. In the case of inspired justifications, proof can be 
presented in the form of the display of emotion or awe (Thévenot et al. 2000, 252). 
Interestingly, the interviewees seem to distance this proof from their individual 
experience and externalize it to some generalized Indian people. For inspiration to act as 
a legitimate justification, it needs to be extended from personal passion to inspiration as 
common good (ibid.). Notwithstanding, with these mentions, the interviewees also 
qualify themselves as worthy speakers by emphasizing their role as coming from a 
country with deeply integrated principles of maintaining a balance with nature. 
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In the material, these inspired nature justifications are almost invariably merged with a 
grasp of the environment as a home. This represents a type of “heritage 
environmentalism” linked to the domestic world, which appreciates a “harmonious 
existence of living on the land”. For wider legitimacy, this generalized personal 
attachment to surroundings is again made into public value by presupposing a shared 
principle where worth is based on locality and tradition. (Thévenot et al. 2000, 250–
251; 259–260.) The mystified human-nature symbiosis brought up in several interviews 
combines inspired and domestic worth to reflect a highly esteemed idea of traditional 
closeness to nature in India. 
In the context of the fight against climate change, it might be argued that the traditional 
human-nature relationship at times acts actually as a sort of an anti-argument; often, it is 
not evoked in order to encourage commitments to the climate change cause, but rather 
to prove being “already there” (I1) in terms of a non-polluting lifestyle. It is rarely 
applied as a justification for action-oriented claims or as grounds to demand 
environmental protection. An underlying paradox lies in the contradiction of the widely 
uttered assertions that the poor already lead a sustainable life and do no pollute 
(interviews; cf. Gadgil & Guha 1995, 107), or, alternatively, that “poverty is the worst 
polluter” (Gandhi 1972; Government of India 2008, 13). Also, the human-nature 
relationship argument implies a mystification of the Indian cultural and religious 
heritage, not to mention an essentialization of rural people. On the other hand, to the 
extent that such a bond does exist, it may provide potential ground for support to 
climate change work, if this kind of environmental sensibility is already existent in the 
cultural foundations of the nation. Some of the interviewees bring up the prospect that 
India, by virtue of its unique connection with nature, could have a lot to share with other 
countries, and perhaps adopt a special role in these terms in the international climate 
change regime: 
 “India has [much] to provide in the solving of, tackling the climate crisis 
 [because] we are country which is known to live, you know, within very 
 close harmony with nature. […] That's probably the reason why despite 
 such a bigger population, we are not polluting to that great extent. […] the 
 concept of environment protection, the concept of living in harmony with 
 the nature, being very green in our own of being, of being an Indian. And I 
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 think India can and needs to, you know, to share this teaching with the 
 world.” (I12)  
In the previous section, climate politics were seen as a vehicle to advancing a form of 
rural livelihood tied to the land for substance. Here, ecology was connected to cultural 
and spiritual heritage. It seems that when it comes to the CSOs’ climate change 
discourse, in statements that explicitly include applied ecological justifications, shallow 
references to a green worth are combined with more forceful principles: ones behind a 
traditional connection with the earth (inspired, domestic) on one hand and survival 
livelihoods (civic, domestic) on the other.  
Through comparative analysis, Thévenot, Moody and Lafaye (2000) have identified 
different forms of valuing the environment. These vary between cultures from example 
“untouched wilderness” to the “productive use of environment” (ibid., 229). The 
findings developed here can be contrasted to understandings of nature found in their 
research. According to the authors, in environmental disputes in the United States, 
wilderness is consistently opposed to domesticated nature, while in France this is not 
necessarily the case. Moreover, in the US, environmental claims are oftentimes united 
to industrial and market justifications. In France, in turn, corresponding arguments tend 
to include mainly industrial and civic modes of justifications; a green worth as such is 
not included in the equation. Value is put on technocratic planning by the state with the 
general interest in mind: in “meeting the needs of the citizens […] collectively and 
equally through the most competent technical planning”. (Ibid., 248, 259.)  
The interviews with Indian CSO actors convey an impression where nature seems to be 
conceived of as a mystified provider, which relationship to human activities is central. It 
is valued through an ideal of harmonious living with the source of livelihood and 
spiritual bliss. The interviewees’ environmental arguments are filled with a combination 
of inspiration and domestic worth. This forms a flexible compromise apt for 
miscellaneous reasoning. These statements are also entangled with the above itemized 
justice and livelihoods claims, which bring equity to the table. The interviews build a 
picture of a form of environmentalism that combines references to the inspired and 
domestic worlds with a particular emphasis on a civic worth. For instance the hybrid 
concept of ecological democracy, which combines a search for balance between the 
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ecosphere and humanity with balance among humans, is on the agenda of quite a few of 
the organizations. A similar approach is captured by Shiva’s (2005) term earth 
democracy, which can be conceptualized as a union of ecological speech with civic and 
inspired worlds, and involves particularly resisting market principles. 
5.5 Rejection of the climate change agenda 
Besides arguments about alternate ways to assess the question of climate change, a type 
of statement often arising in the interviews that cannot be left unmentioned is the view 
that climate change is not a primary issue in India whatsoever. According to this 
perception, India should look to other priorities than climate change – mainly to the 
overriding concern of poverty. Almost all interviewees bring up this argument, either as 
a reasonable fact that their or others justifications can be based on, or as something 
lamentable. Many refer to this sentiment as a reason for lack of adequate climate change 
debate in the country or for the general concentration on other burning issues. It 
encompasses the widely heard claim that environmental consciousness can only evolve 
once a certain degree of well-being or comfort is acquired: 
 “If you have enough to eat, enough to wear in terms of clothes and all; and 
 you have house, [when] they have all things available, then they will come 
 to things, ‘oh, I should take care of environmental also’, […] it's a basic 
 sense, you know: if you don't have food or you don't have roads or school 
 or basic amenities, how can you think of climate change?” (I1) 
Furthermore, some interviewees make disparaging remarks on the climate change 
discussion as well as on the ever-revolving international negotiations. Climate change 
can be perceived of as a foreign agenda, which one should engage in merely in order to 
prevent unfavorable or unjust decisions and policies. Many have lost faith in the UN 
process, but continue participating in the debate, if for no other reason, at least out of a 
civic sense of duty to express the views of the civil society. It is suggested in quite a few 
of the interviews that any changes that are being agreed upon on the international arena 
are merely cosmetic ones, keeping in place the global and national power structures and 
divisions of wealth. A common concern is that all the talk about climate change might 
be distracting attention from other also, and from a grassroots perspective more pressing 
issues, like destitution. These claims ignore the importance of green worth completely. 
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While being engaged in climate change related work, many civil society actors seem to 
consider legitimate the common argument that stabilizing the climate is of secondary 
importance in the Indian context. This might be interpreted to mean that, similarly to the 
Indian government’s claim that climate mitigation demands endanger development, the 
CSOs apparently contrast within their logic development and the environment, or 
economy and ecology – the market worth and the green worth. This bears resemblance 
to an anti-environmentalist argument based on the market worth stating that ecology is 
too expensive (Thévenot et al. 2000, 240–242). But the pattern is not this unambiguous. 
Survival as the object of emphasis is not quite the same as growth, which the standard 
paradigm of development builds upon. It cannot be simply attributed to the market 
world. Besides economic development on a country level, the CSOs seem to be talking 
about development as poverty reduction, and more importantly, about the right to a 
minimum standard of human existence. Thus, it is not entirely correct to automatically 
categorize development claims within a market worth. Insisting on covering basic needs 
and amenities for all clearly implies a civic claim. Solidarity towards the poor is seen as 
an overriding and more acute need than ecological concerns; this is a clear moral stand. 
Another point made by some interviewees is that CSOs might be working with climate 
change issues and green-labeling their agendas simply because there is money to it. As 
stated before, Indian CSOs are dependent on (mostly foreign) funding, which for its part 
sways along with which problematic is fashionable, so to say, at each taken moment. 
These statements indicate implicit resentment of the widespread concentration on 
climate change as a theme mainly due to international influence, pressure and funds. 
Motivators of the market word and fame are rejected. Apart from relying on unaccepted 
worths, the hegemonic agenda is sometimes presented as a deviation from the common 
good. It is being pushed through with an unimpeded logic of engagement in a plan 
without a publicly debatable option. Developing country CSOs have been critical of an 
unstoppable climate change “bandwagon” of scientists and state officials with a rich 
countries’ agenda “hijacking” resources and policy efforts away from more immediate 
issues (Gough and Shackley 2001, 336). 
The agenda defined by the global civil society, often represented as uniform, is also 
sometimes resented by Indian organizations. A degree of climate fatigue can be noticed 
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in certain utterances. Although all of the interviewees are engaged in climate change 
issues in one way or another, some unease with the climate change question is 
detectable in many of the interviews. Particularly one interviewee has adopted a critical 
stance. He exclaims that it is actually “counterproductive” to work on climate change 
(I9a), and a comprehensive solution would require an outright re-evaluation of current 
lifestyles. The interviewee brings up the stance that climate change is not an important 
issue in India because of the overwhelming poverty that still exists in the country. From 
this perspective, even so called climate justice does not present itself like an adequate 
starting point for discussion, when what is on the table is nothing less than survival: 
 “What I am saying is you should understand our kind of different stage of 
 our debate. That most of the groups are fighting survival livelihoods […] 
 We could say centered around, not the equity or equality, but share 
 minimalistic standard of human dignity and livelihoods. […] These are 
 our entry points to marry the environment conditions and justice issues, so 
 if you defend them saying environmental justice, then it […] becomes 
 sensitivity to environment rather than environmental justice. That 
 comes much later […] 
 --environmental justice will have this as the constituency: these one billion 
 polluters who are the polluters, who are the policy planners, who control 
 the think tanks, who control all the debates, who control all entry climate 
 literature, giving false solutions. We are not treating that as our 
 constituency, we do not [have to be] aware of it all. We do not have the 
 resources to counter them, we tell them: go to hell. […] we have no power 
 […] which they have, and we have no power of the mass following, 
 because our people are fighting the survival battle and not the 
 environmental justice battle.” (I9a) 
The interviewee strongly argues that climate change cannot be given priority over 
survival issues. He directs harsh criticism at the environmental justice framework, 
stating that its constituency does not in fact consist of those whose rights presupposes to 
be advocating, but rather of the global elite. The climate justice framework does not 
appear to pass his civic test. He discards climate justice theories as irrelevant foreign 
philosophic fabrications and resents their forced application. The grassroots worker’s 
caustic comments oblige any theorist to perform some introspection: “sometimes we are 
burdened with the kind of self-righteousness, because of their idealism […] they 
become very arrogant” (I9a). Although the interviewee generally refers to civic values 
when making his claims, this extract does not maintain to take part in a public debate on 
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climate issues. It does not even try to justify its grounds on higher principles; these are 
seen as redundant when what is at stake is simply day-to-day survival. While 
populations’ long-term survival can be used as a justification in the climate change 
scenario, what is adverted to here is immediate, basic survival. This seems to fall below 
the requirement of public justification. The representative’s orientation indicates that the 
organization’s communication with their “their people” might operate within a rhetoric 
approaching the regime of familiar engagements.  
5.6 Effective planning  
A final form of argumentation commonly utilized in the interviewed CSO actors’ 
speech highlights the importance of concrete mitigation and adaptation efforts and 
places trust in climate science in providing answers for the problems brought about by 
climate change. The argument maintains that we should look for practical, proven 
solutions to the problem of climate change rather than concentrate on endless political 
debates. This techno-centric outlook values adequate planning above all. A fairly clear-
cut set of civil society actors favor this approach. While a few of these organizations 
concentrate on top-down policies, among Indian CSOs, this line of argumentation is 
mainly concentrated on grassroots science. These organizations stress that: “--it is 
important to understand not only the politics of climate change, but at the same time the 
science and application on the ground” (I3).  
Accordingly, planning arguments can be further divided into two strands. The first 
maintains that focus should be on local livelihoods and grassroots adaptation. 
Illustrating the distinctiveness of the discourse, an interviewee describes how “--we are 
into finding systemic solutions”: translating implications of climate change on 
communities and finding out how to address them, because “ultimately everything boils 
down to action on the ground” (I3). The second strand puts faith in the state planning 
machinery. In this context, the CSOs’ task is to provide informed inputs to action plans 
and other policy papers. Climate change is seen as a technical problem, for which a 
series of technical fixes can be distinguished: 
 “I normally sum up the problem of climate change as being set so: When a 
 person is sick, the first and the primary thing that the person is supposed to 
 do is avoid certain things, right, avoid eating certain things, avoid doing 
74 
 
 certain things, depending on the type of sickness you have. Now, once you 
 get well, you can begin doing those things again, and till you get well, you 
 take medicine. So, it is also like that. I think the world, at whatever level, 
 needs to suspend certain types of lifestyle habits maybe for 10 or 15 years 
 or 20 years, I don't know that – I mean modelers would tell that – but 
 suspend certain types of consumption, certain types of lifestyle practices 
 and take rest in the scientific medicine and struggle with the new type of 
 consumption habits for some time. And once things are back on track, you 
 can start doing those things again.” (I5) 
At first look, it might be difficult to recognize the ethical aspect of these arguments, as 
they seem to be deliberately framed amoral. However, the justifications used in 
conjunction with these technical arguments include the implicit assumption of an 
ultimate common good lying in the best, most efficient and working solution, just 
waiting to be defined. The types of statements discussed above rely on the industrial 
order of worth, which values efficiency and expert knowledge.  The previous quote, 
with its series of actions that need to be performed like “scientific medicine”, is 
representative of industrial argumentation. Its talk of “modelers” like doctors, “worthy” 
trained professionals, is also noteworthy; occupational expertize is highly valued within 
the industrial world (Thévenot 2007, 419).  
In the Indian CSO field, work that focuses on local sustainability and adaptive 
capacities most often goes hand in hand with the commonplace use of industrial 
justifications. Within this hands-on line of work, worth is attributed to effective 
scientific expert-solutions to concrete livelihood problems. Quite obviously, research 
activities can also be associated with industrial justifications, as well as the more 
outspread mitigation work. This translates into the logic that when the main goal is to 
tackle climate change, the best measure of worth is effectivity in doing so. Common 
good lies in efficiency, and worthy people are the experts and scientists who hold the 
potential solutions. The planet itself is left out of the discussion. When arguing within 
the industrial world, ecology does not present itself as a separate question; 
environmental problems are rather simply a question of correct monitoring and 
management (Latour 2003, 79).  
The environment has a heavy presence in industrial justifications in another sense, 
however. Natural phenomena or measurable features and changes of the environment 
75 
 
can act as back-up for arguments. The tangible reality is substantially present in climate 
change related claims. Material indicators are evident in the interviewees’ speech; they 
bring up these elements in their statements as “proof” in reality tests. Implications of 
climate change to food production, fishing and forestry are often stated in support of 
diverse claims. The material world is brought to the forefront, with a particular focus on 
concrete grassroots effects. When it comes to industrial justifications, relying on 
scientific “facts”, or so-called climate science, is common in statements. 
The climate discussion is thick with scientific discourses. Climate science was 
established as the foundation for international climate action, and institutionalized with 
the creation of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (Goodman 
2009, 510). It represents an influential discourse. CSOs can adopt scientific language in 
their advocacy work and thus claim the “discursive high ground” in the climate debate 
(ibid.). But they must also make choices between justice and science arguments, or 
attempt to combine these, to make arguments both ethically relevant and viable. The 
interviewees bring up the ambiguity of expert talk on climate change. Some respondents 
accept climate science as providing legitimate knowledge on climate change and 
eventually solving the problem, while others express the concern that developed 
countries’ being “smart” on climate change provides a chance to manipulate “not very 
smart” developing countries. This raises the question of whose knowledge: not all forms 
of conceptualizing the world are considered equally legitimate. It seems that the 
discussion fora on climate change generally tend to favor ways of knowing that acquire 
industrial worth. The interviewed CSOs use science arguments, but also criticize them:  
 “As such, if one looks at the techno-centric approach, technology offers 
 a very nice balancing vehicle, that you have to produce more with less 
 resources and that can be done only through technology […] Now, that 
 type of understanding, which is the dominant understanding in the 
 climate discourse, in some sense rules out the possibility of 
 questioning the current paradigm of development, which is very 
 resource intensive, or which is actually consumption intensive […]” (I5) 
This statement presents critique of industrial argumentation and particularly of the 
market principles underlying the dominant paradigm of development. A general 
denunciation of market justifications is noticeable among the interviewees. Indian CSOs 
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also commonly reject the combination of industrial and market worth which they 
conceive of as ruling the global climate regime. Although justification theory generally 
does not pay much attention to such power aspects, the determination of the most 
legitimate ways of justifying speech in a particular context often essentially forms a 
power battle, where those with most resources have an advantage in defining the 
dominant discourse (cf. Luhtakallio & Ylä-Anttila 2011, 45). 
Others have commented on the perceived threats of a techno-centric outlook, too. 
According to Goodman (2009, 510), the danger of scientism lays in the illusion of 
apolitical technological causes and fixes. Climate science can be seen from a critical 
perspective as an exclusive “elitist mode of knowledge”, which causes “vulnerability to 
techno-managerial initiatives” (Gough & Shackley 2001, 332). The knowledge-based 
approach to climate change assessment and policy is forwarded by the “science-policy 
nexus”. Some CSOs may form part of this epistemic community. In order to participate 
in this debate, it is necessary for them to move their discourse towards science and 
technical measures, away from ethical and overtly political matters such as equity and 
development issues. (Ibid.) Managerial framing, technocratization and de-politicization 
of climate politics base hope in a technological solution yet to be discovered. Climate 
change is framed as a problem to be dealt with from above, “through the techniques of 
scientific and economic management rather than through social and political 
transformation”. This kind of view re-legitimizes current lifestyles and dominant policy 
orientations. Furthermore, it can be stated that it “obscures the many local conflicts over 
scarce resources and land use that are as constitutive of ‘climate change’ as any abstract 
figure expressing the amount of CO2 in the atmosphere”. (Brand et al. 2009, 11–12.) 
Within the interviewees’ speech, industrial statements are often seen as opposing to 
justice claims. When discussing climate change, CSOs seem to find themselves in 
argumentative situations where they have to make a choice regarding their relationship 
to science. The following quote represents a statement discarding climate justice claims 
from the grounds of an industrial logic, positioned as superior: 
 “Climate justice is a – so, there are some NGOs who don't have 
 technical understanding of these sorts of, the climate change. They are 
 not very much technically sound in understanding the issues of climate 
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 change. They feel India is a poor country, and in the name of climate 
 change [clean] technologies […] is imposed on India. India cannot pay, 
 afford to pay so much on clean technologies, and it is a design of the 
 developed nations to exploit us financially and make us further weak. And 
 justice, they feel India – it is injustice to ask India to pay more for the 
 climate […]” (I2) 
The interviewee interprets climate justice as something incompatible with effectively 
tackling the threat to our atmosphere. The argument excludes climate justice advocates 
from worthy speakers within the industrial world due to a lack of “technical 
understanding”. Others in turn maintain that the scientific approach is equally 
“culturally and politically constructed” (Damodaran 2010, 302) than the equity reading. 
The CSOs’ argumentation on climate change is for a large part located between and 
within the civic and industrial worlds, which are contrasted with each other. 
*** 
This chapter discussed prominent arguments that the interviewed civil society actors 
present. Two important argument blocks can be outlined from the discussions with the 
CSOs as a whole. The interviews contain a juxtaposition of civic and industrial 
justifications. These stand out as the most powerful justifications in the debate, and are 
portrayed as somewhat incompatible. I have suggested that the civic mode of 
justification is by far most commonly employed by the interviewed CSOs’ actors. 
Referral to principles and values worthy in the civic world permeates the material. 
Although other justifications do occur in the claims made by civil society actors on 
climate change issues, they are often combined with civic qualifications. Similarly, 
when citing other actors or reference groups’ often opposing arguments, they are 
commonly rejected from the perspective of what is valuable within the civic world. As 
for the industrial mode of justification behind the effective planning arguments, a 
distinction can be found between a more abstract and numerical approach to the science 
and governance of climate change, and a hands-on grasp on concrete issues causing and 
caused by climate change. Both imply a managerial and technical outlook on the issue.  
A world of ecology is implicit is the discussion, but it is not evoked as a separate 
justification. Green worth is perhaps not as viable in the political context of India, as 
one interviewee illustrates: “for instance, shutting down a thermal power plant today, 
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governments cannot afford it because the moment you do it for climate purposes, people 
would be angry” (I5). The legitimacy of green justifications seems to be increased when 
they are combined with civic justifications. On the other hand, interviewees bring up 
that environmental consciousness is part of the Indian heritage. The mystified nature 
speech behind the traditional human-nature relationship argument presents a peculiar 
combination of inspired and domestic qualifications with an environmental edge. 
The interviews show that the CSOs quite consistently emphasize the global equity 
aspect of climate change, similarly to Indian negotiators: “on international issues 
[CSOs] always supported the […] Indian government position”, although there is “a 
very conscious double stand” (I11). This duality refers to the point that on the 
international face Indian civil society is aligned, but nationally the debate is somewhat 
more complicated. Dubash (2009, 1, 8–12) has made an informative classification of 
Indian positions on climate change. He identifies growth-first stonewallers, who are 
strictly against further commitment to global climate governance, which they conceive 
of as a geopolitical threat form the North; progressive realists, who recognize the 
dangers of climate change to India, but are cynical about the international process and 
prefer to look for suitable domestic actions to an internalized climate objective 
according to a national interest to mitigate and adapt; and a small segment of 
progressive internationalists, who demand an effective global climate regime. CSOs 
can be mainly categorized as progressive realists, with a few progressive 
internationalists among the lot. What is noteworthy in Dubash’s categorization is that 
equity perspectives are present in all of the described standpoints. India’s official 
position combines civic with market justifications to resist mitigation demands. While 
the position is influenced by the civil society, as shown, the government has not adopted 
the civil society’s critique of the growth-centered development model (Lele 2012, 209).  
When comparing the civic, domestic, inspired and industrial justifications used in civil 
society’s climate change arguments in India with those most commonly presented in 
other settings, it can be noted that they differ in many aspects. Globally, the climate 
change discussion generally entails technology-oriented environmentalism, often with 
an acceptance of market worth. Official international actors, such as the IPCC and the 
UNFCCC, including their member countries as well as the mainstream media, tend to 
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frame climate change as “a scientific problem and budgetary liability”, while many 
activist feel that other experiences, such as global injustice, should be prioritized (Reitan 
& Gibson 2012, 398). In justification term, this entails a clash of worlds between 
industrial and market definitions on the one hand and mainly civic ones on the other. 
The effective planning discourse is fairly strong among Indian CSOs likely because of 
its legitimacy on many levels. Industrial arguments resonate well with the international 
climate change debate, the global regime being heavy with scientific discourses and 
entailing a managerial approach (e.g. ibid.; Brand et al. 2009; Goodman 2009).  
The market logic is highly valued on the international arena and in many countries, 
including their civil societies. For example, in USA, market-based arguments are widely 
used (Lamont & Thévenot 2000) and even environmental justifications are bound to 
them (Thévenot et al. 2000). The climate debate in the country, including civil society 
voices, contains a common usage of market and industrial justifications (Korpivaara 
2013). But within the Indian CSO field market worth is not common currency; it is only 
present when fiercely denounced. Among the interviewees, the market world is nothing 
short of left out of the set legitimate justifications. It seems that the worlds of market 
and fame are largely irrelevant for the CSO actors’ arguments. Fame is not used in a 
positive sense to justify statements, but is implied when denounced: the interviewees 
resent India acting in order to gain acceptance on the international arena. Market 
solutions, such as carbon trading, are addressed within an industrial dispute (based on 
their efficiency: whether they work or not), or denounced from the outset from civic 
grounds. In the case of Indian CSOs, market worth is seen as starkly opposed to the 
central civic principles. I would not categorize the CSOs’ concern for the poor as 
valuing market worth, as in economic growth aspirations. Rather, it represents calls for 
solidarity from the civic world. Civic criteria are also generally more utilized for 
instance in France (Lamont & Thévenot 2000), where claims on climate change 
emphasize civic values (Kukkonen 2013). Contrary to the findings here, though, within 
French environmental discourses civic equity arguments are tightly bound with 
industrial planning arguments (Thévenot et al. 2000). In line with my perception of 
India’s context, Huikuri (2011) has argued that the Indian media debate on climate 
change features a heavy presence of solidarity and responsibility claims, with references 
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to mainly civic and industrial principles. But, within the civil society field, these seem 
to be contrasted within statements, as opposed to the example of France. Also, the 
inspired and domestic justifications that can be recognized through in-depth interviews 
do not manifest in the Indian mainstream media. 
Why do civic justifications seem to be so common in India? Equity arguments’ material 
base lies in the persistent concrete deprivation experienced in the country. It can be seen 
as not only the material back-up for arguments, but also the root they stem from. An 
obvious, reverse remark when pondering on the prevalence of justice arguments from 
the part of vocal developing country representatives would be that “the poor” are a more 
legitimate “card” to back up arguments with; one invoking a form of common good in 
solidarity, rather than simply refusing participation in international efforts to save the 
planet. Equity formulations can be used as a strategic tool for developing country 
negotiators (Rao 2012, 153). As opposed to a “we” that resists limits to “our” emissions, 
committing oneself to the national development agenda and poverty-reduction-aka-
growth according to the regime of engagement in a plan, it allows for evoking a civic 
common good. On the other hand, protecting India as a nation qualifies for “domestic” 
worth. But neither of these provides an exhaustive analysis; there is more to these 
statements than strategic framing.
15
 Civic justifications seem to build up to a most 
institutionalized injustice frame (Gamson 1992) and act as collective interpretation of 
the situation and the way it violates shared moral principles. 
Several particular reasons can be proposed for the domination of civic justifications 
within the CSO’s talk on climate change. First, the climate change field in India is 
primarily dominated by so-called development organizations, which comprise the 
majority of CSOs in the country (Jayal 2001, 134). The greater part of CSOs active on 
climate change issues in India count as development organizations, instead of the 
internationally more typical environmental ones. Development organizations’ main 
concerns have to do with issues that are given primacy in the civic world to begin with. 
Democracy and justice are integrated into their agenda, which obviously affects the 
emphasis of the civil society discussion on climate change. Second, on a deeper level it 
                                                 
15
 As a dispute within the civic world, a part of the civil society actors denounce the Indian government 
for this kind of expediency, as was mentioned in section 5.1.  
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could be argued that in India civil society environmentalism, most notably as 
represented by the environmental movement, has always exemplified a form of justice 
environmentalism. It has been concerned with those affected by environmental 
convulsion and degradation, and resulted in an environmentalism of the poor (Guha 
1997, also: Gadgil & Guha 1995, 98; Jayal 2001; Karan 1994; Swain 1997). Finally, 
behind all this, justice arguments seem to be generally very viable in India. Various 
strong ideological currents emphasize these types of values. The Gandhian tradition and 
a leftist heritage are visible also in environmentalist thinking (Gadgil and Guha 1995). 
When undertaking the task of public justification, these types of perceptions of common 
good appear to be highly legitimate in the Indian political culture. Equality and social 
justice have been found to count among some of the main ideas and political principles 
that make up the political world in India (e.g. Mehta & Pantham 2006). 
The basic premises of most of the arguments brought forward by the CSOs often 
overlap. The arguments for justice, survival and traditional livelihoods close to nature 
together build a picture of the civil society field’s general stance on climate change. A 
conjoined form of argumentation can be shaped out of the argument families elaborated 
through the analysis. Arguments that evoke civic, inspired and domestic principles can 
be merged into an understanding of a unique form of inspired justice environmentalism 
(IJE). This mind-set is opposed to the industrial approach of effective planning, favored 
by certain organizations or in certain contexts. These distinct ways of seeing the issue of 
climate change correspond to political and seemingly apolitical sectors of argumentation 
and work within the spectrum of CSOs. Structural and cultural factors can be traced 
behind the prevalence of IJE as an argumentative form in the civil society’s climate 
change conversations. These will be elaborated in the discussion chapter that follows.  
6 Discussion and conclusions: Civil society and moral 
argumentation 
This thesis contributes with new knowledge on the previously unexplored field of 
Indian civil society’s involvement in climate change issues. India is a major actor in 
international climate politics. Its stance is of critical importance in negotiations, and the 
center of according attention. However, civil society participation in climate politics in 
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the country has thus far not been studied in depth. The global significance of civil 
society in climate change issues from the grassroots up to international decision-making 
fora is increasingly acknowledged. This study finds that in India, civil society 
organizations have in fact markedly influenced the official position on climate change 
and played an integral part in formulating climate policy. 
The purpose of the research was to assess what CSOs do related to climate change in 
India, and what are the main arguments they advance and how they justify these climate 
political positions. In short, five distinct but interrelated fields of action that Indian 
CSOs employ in their climate change related work can be identified: awareness-raising, 
policy advocacy, research activities, mitigation strategies and adaptation support. 
According to the interviewees’ conceptualizations of the global threat, climate change is 
above all “about” equity, livelihoods, and ultimately, survival. The interviewed CSO 
representatives’ climate political arguments can be classified into six main themes of 
emphasis: climate justice, democratic policy-making process, primacy of protecting 
livelihoods, the traditional human-nature relationship, effective planning, and 
occasionally, rejection of the climate change agenda.  
The identified action forms carry some interesting specificities. Awareness-raising is 
comparatively speaking a significant component of action among the Indian CSO field. 
The reason for this is that there is little knowledge among population about climate 
change (Leiserowitz & Jagadish 2012); especially people outside the readership of 
English-speaking press are left out of the discussion. As for advocacy, civil society has 
notably had a substantial role in the climate politics of India. Its more established 
strands support the state in policy-making and sit at international negotiating tables. 
Other specificities of advocacy work include the fact that personal connections and 
insider capacity seem to be particularly required, and that there is no mass action, such 
as demonstrations, on climate change. This is probably because awareness on the issue 
is low, but also, rallying occurs for more acute concerns (Karan 1994; Swain 1997). The 
production of research-based information stands out since CSOs actually draft 
governmental policy papers based on their research, which induces considerable 
leverage for them. Advisory organizations are deeply integrated with official instances, 
as the capacity of ministries themselves for policy research is low (Jayal 2001). CSOs’ 
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mitigation action in India is less centered on targeting their own government and more 
directed towards the global arena, as rich countries are seen as holding responsibility for 
tackling climate change. Although civil society has been observed to target corporations 
in environmental conflict situations such as protests against dam projects (Gadgil & 
Guha 1994), targeting the private sector for emission reductions is virtually inexistent. 
Finally, adaptation work is strikingly much more prevalent in India than in the North, as 
the effects of climate change are already felt on the subcontinent (Dash 2010).
16
 
The study finds that Indian CSOs introduce a strong equity orientation to the context of 
climate change. When they are faced with the global problem of climate change, civil 
society actors support arguments mainly with justifications pertaining to the civic 
world. Most of the interviewees would claim that a “balanced man–nature relationship 
cannot be achieved unless and until there is a balance, an equitable relationship, 
between people” (I5). The civic claims are amplified with allusions to a traditional 
human-nature relationship in India, backing up the paramount contradiction that the 
poor are the victims, not the causers of climate change. This builds up into a 
conglomerate of arguments and normative stands that can be described as inspired 
justice environmentalism (IJE). IJE is constituted of demands for distributive and 
procedural justice combined with emphasis on grassroots survival and livelihoods, and 
harmony with nature. It approaches climate change from the perspective of civic, 
domestic and inspired worth.  
The dominance of IJE among the Indian CSOs, however, is not absolute. A second, 
managerial-scientific line of argumentation is occasionally employed. The most 
important division in the argumentation scene is situated between arguments adhering to 
civic justifications and ones adhering to industrial justifications. The managerial 
effective planning argument is juxtaposed to the other prominent claims within the 
actors’ speech on climate change, which form the IJE standpoint. What all of the CSO’ 
arguments have in common, on the other hand, is the presence of a distinctive                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
quest for sustainable paths of development. Emphasis is on the social (civic) side of the 
                                                 
16
 When considering the findings, it should be understood that these are results of exploratory research, 
not of comparative study. The tentative explanations proposed here should not be interpreted as 
established facts, but as hypotheses. 
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sustainable development triangle, rather than the economic (market) or environmental 
(green) aspects. IJE is also contrasted in the interviews with a form of argumentation 
that values market worth, which has an established presence in the general international 
climate political regime. A break-down of IJE and all of the main arguments present in 
the discussion with their respective modes of justification is portrayed in table 1.  
An independent ecological worth is not brought into the arguments as often as one 
might expect. This is perhaps not as surprising as at first sight, since most of the 
organizations in question after all work with advocating primarily values of human 
solidarity. What the CSO actors say is inherently linked to what they do. Most are not 
solely environmental organizations, but organizations working with people. The 
importance of justice arguments partly stems from the fact that there are more 
development organizations than environmental ones involved in the field of climate 
change, as India’s distinctively development-oriented CSOs have incorporated climate 
change onto their agenda, and many existing concerns are being recognized as climate 
change related. Many CSOs’ principal ambition regarding climate change is to include 
all levels of society, also the disadvantaged and those most direly affected by climate 
change and climate policies, into the public policy-making process, both through 
representation or participation and contentually by taking them and their concerns and 
development needs into consideration in the climate change equation. The evidence 
indicates that green values are valid only as part of an environmentalism of the poor 
(Guha 1997). The CSOs’ ecology speech largely operates within civic, domestic and 
inspired worlds, or even in the regime of familiar engagements. 
Table 1 also shows the way that arguments and actions are specifically linked. To some 
extent, the CSOs’ agenda defines their mediums and vice versa. Organizations with an 
awareness-raising function quite uniformly promote justice arguments, while ones 
concentrating on mitigation and adaptation often adopt a more scientific discourse. 
Advocacy-inclined organizations in turn include diverse claims in their speech. 
Research organizations are divided between the climate science and climate justice 
approaches – along the lines of choice between insider and outsider strategies 
(Gulbrandsen & Andresen 2004). Clearest lines of division in the civil society field 
involved in climate change issues can be drawn between grassroots organizations and
 Table 1 Arguments in inspired justice environmentalism (including opposing and absent arguments) 
ARGUMENT PREVALENCE JUSTIFICATION TYPICAL ACTION FORMS KEY WORDS  
1. Main arguments in IJE: 
 
    
 
        1a. Climate justice High Civic  
Awareness-raising, advocacy,  
research, adaptation 
Equity,  
responsibility 
        1b. Democratic process High Civic  
Awareness-raising,  
advocacy 
Voice,  
representation 
        1c. Primacy of livelihoods Low 
Civic,  
domestic  
Advocacy, mitigation, 
adaptation 
Rights,  
man on the ground 
        1d. Traditional human-nature   
               relationship  
Medium 
Inspired,  
domestic 
Any 
Harmony,  
mother earth 
        1e. Rejection of climate  
              change agenda 
Low Civic Advocacy, adaptation 
Survival, 
basic needs 
 
2. Opposing argument: 
     Effective planning 
Medium Industrial 
Research, mitigation, 
adaptation 
 Efficiency,  
climate science 
3. Absent line of argumentation: 
    Market optimism 
Absent Market N/A 
False solutions, 
business-as-usual 
(denounced) 
 8
5
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highly established research institutes that are included in the decision-making 
machinery, or even subcontractors to the state. These can be said to correspond to 
activist or change-oriented organizations, with a justice emphasis, and advisory or 
techno-managerial organizations, embracing a planning approach (cf. Gulbrandsen &  
Andresen 2004; Oommen 2004). Advisory organizations’ being “with the government” 
is sometimes resented by other civil society groups. Thus, organization types are 
connected with the identified argument blocks. However, the climate dispute does not 
take place merely between specific organizations; both main lines of argumentation can 
be found in both types of organizations. CSOs that present IJE and planning arguments 
are to some degree different, but not consistently. Organizations differ in their 
argumentation, albeit not systematically, as speakers utilize several of the registered 
justifications when participating in the discussion. Considering the overlaps, the modes 
of argumentation can be understood as morally grounded argumentation repertoires, 
often implicitly targeting the Indian or international arena respectively. 
It is possible to trace particular historically formed structures behind the prevalence of 
IJE as a discursive phenomenon. The interviewees’ talk includes an underlying 
assumption that other themes than climate change mitigation are more acute priorities in 
India. Specifically existing intense poverty and concrete deprivation (see Malik 2013) 
together with the already materializing effects of climate change (e.g. Srinivasan 2012) 
are present in the discussion and result in an equity reading of the situation. 
Explanations for an environmentalism concerned with equity cannot be viewed as 
residing only in mental attitudes, as it has actual physical deterioration as a backdrop 
(Guha 1997). Arguments are also bound in the perceived unjust reality. Particularly 
India’s low per capita emissions compared to other countries comprise an inequality 
factor (Watkins 2007). In addition to India’s emissions profile and current poverty and 
vulnerability, previous experiences of exploitation and ecologically unequal exchange 
should be noted. India’s relatively weak position in the world system from colonial 
times onwards is reflected in climate political stances, as a country’s position in the 
global hierarchy affects understandings of what is fair (Parks & Roberts 2010).  
In addition to these structural factors, distinct cultural characteristics that convey them 
can be specified. A justice inclination seems to be typical of Indian civil society; 
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previous environmental movements have also been distinctively concerned with issues 
of human equity as well as ecological questions (Jayal 2001; Karan 1994; Swain 1997). 
This orientation helps explain current thinking on climate change among civil society, 
and confirms the plausibility of results. It can be broke down into a more in-depth 
explanation for the findings. Climate change argumentation can be related to preceding 
strands of environmentalism as represented by the Crusading Gandhians, Ecological 
Marxists and Appropriate Technologists identified by Gadgil and Guha (1995, 107–112, 
introduced in section 2.3). IJE shares with all of these the emphasis on civic worth and 
denunciation of market values. It can be argued that the prevalence of Gandhian 
antimodernist thought in Indian civil society leads to the generality of domestic and 
inspired justifications and the weakness of industrial justifications. Widespread leftist 
thought and condemning the quest for profit in turn effectuates the absence of market 
justifications. Similarly to environmental movements, CSOs conceive of polluters in the 
climate change context as distinct from the affected, and make a qualitative distinction 
between luxury emissions and survival emissions (Lele 2012, 211–212). The strong 
global aspect inherent in climate change adds to these collective readings an 
institutionalized international position which leads to the prevalence of civic 
justifications: the anti-colonialist outlook on climate change, stemming from global 
historical structures, entails seeing rich countries as culprits and India as innocent (Billet 
2010; Vihma 2011). Finally, the prevalence of nature mysticism (Brara 2003; Shiva 
2005) results in the presence of inspired justifications. Figure 1 outlines the compiled 
potential explanations for the prevalence of an argumentative form called inspired 
justice environmentalism.  
Figure 1 Explanations for the prevalence of IJE among Indian civil society organizations 
 
 
 
 
STRUCTURAL FACTORS 
Inspired justice 
environmentalism CULTURAL FACTORS 
• Rampant poverty 
• Vulnerability to  
climate change 
• Low emissions per capita 
• Position in world system 
• Gandhian 
antimodernism 
• Nature mysticism 
• Leftist thought 
• Anticolonialism 
• Civic + 
• Domestic + 
• Inspired + 
• Industrial - 
• Market - 
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It seems that the interviewees’ argumentation on climate change, promoting a 
distinctive justice emphasis, is essentially concentrated on other issues than actual 
ecology. The detected discursive phenomenon is here attached to its concrete and social 
setting, starting from the “state of the world” – structural factors that both back up 
arguments and are at their root – up to certain cultural frames of reference for 
understanding environmental issues, as reflected in previous environmentalisms, which 
are also concerned with equity issues and perhaps qualitatively different from “typical” 
Western environmentalisms. Environmental issues in the South are inevitably justice 
issues, at once concerned with the sustainability and inclusivity of development 
(Khoday & Natarajan 2012, 440).  
Indian civil society has forcefully pushed for the justice cause in the climate change 
debate. I have noted civil society’s ability to diffuse norms that can transform the 
behavior of state actors that need to keep their actions legitimate in regard to a 
perceived set of common values (Malik 2013, 111; Parks & Roberts 2010, 138). CSOs 
are in turn influenced by, and imposed to take a stand on, the environmental agenda of 
the “global civil society”, which they modify to be in line with local priorities and ways 
of conceptualizing environmental issues. Constructivist views have observed the way 
ideas and values spread across borders. But “entrepreneuring” (Parks & Roberts 2010) 
for the institutionalization of norms CSOs consider important does not take place in a 
vacuum; it is embedded in the material, political, and cultural surroundings. For one 
part, the CSOs have introduced an equity perspective to the public climate debate in 
India. But this type of argumentation was well received in the first place, since – apart 
from shifting responsibility for action away from the side of India – the thematization 
resonates well in Indian political culture. Equity claims seem to be considered widely 
legitimate in the Indian climate debate, and justice is a central political “idea” in Indian 
political culture (e.g. Mehta & Pantham 2006).  
Like cultural frames in general (e.g. Benford & Snow 2000; Gamson 1992), the 
presence and legitimacy of repertoires of moral evaluation differ between political 
cultures (Lamont & Thévenot 2000; Moody & Thévenot 2000). The salience of 
different types of criteria of evaluation differs according to conditions, which compel 
actors to draw on some components of the repertoires rather than others. The likelihood 
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to make use of particular cultural tools to construct and assess the world varies between 
members of different national communities. (Lamont & Thévenot 2000, 8.) In this 
sense, Benford and Snow (2000, 624) refer to the extent to which a frame “taps into 
existing cultural values, beliefs, narratives and the like”, while Gamson (1992) similarly 
notes that the available repertory of politics helps explain why certain ideologies and 
frames resonate with their audiences and others do not. Through the justification 
perspective, it is possible to deduce broader cultural models of understanding and 
evoking the “common good” underlying the evaluative dynamics of each country by 
comparing the construction of argumentation (Moody & Thévenot 2000). The CSOs’ 
arguments itemized here are useful for the actors, but they also need to fit the 
surrounding opportunity structure (see Benford & Snow 2000, 628). When political 
culture is understood as a continuum that includes both actions and institutions, 
structures are present in actions as habits (Ylä-Anttila 2010b). 
Jasper (1997) recognizes the important but often ignored moral aspect of civil society 
movements operation. He aptly brings moral visions to the forefront of studying 
activism, challenging an overly cognitive take on the subject. He states that “emotions, 
morals and cognition – embodied in practical know-how – are equally important 
components of culture” (ibid., 98). It can be argued that such a psychological approach 
to advocacy and moral is still not quite adequate to conceptualize the ethically loaded 
work done by CSOs. The approach outlined here views justifications as collective moral 
compilations that can both spur action and legitimize it. “Critical capacity” at work can 
be observed in communication and participation in politics. Processes of appreciation 
and argumentation are however not disconnected from the surroundings. This approach 
allows better grasping the connection between collective norms and action.  
Tapping into a wider discussion on civil society, a few conclusions can be made in 
relation to previous studies. Ample literature suggests that civil society involvement in 
climate politics increases accountability (e.g. Dombrowski 2010; Newell 2008). 
Evidence in this study regarding this assertion is twofold. On one hand, the vast 
majority of CSOs clearly make a priority of advancing the affairs of those without a 
voice. On the other, some report “writing for them”: being deeply integrated with 
official policy-makers and responsible mainly vertically for results, all but disconnected 
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from the field. This relates to fears of CSOs becoming “too” engaged in climate 
governance (Gough & Shackley 2001). It is often stated that CSOs can act as links 
between the grassroots and decision-making levels (e.g. Dombrowski 2010). This very 
general statement can be specified with insight on why this process is necessary. 
Besides the more obvious questions of numbers and reach that require representatives 
for people on the ground (direct democracy would be an impossibility beyond a village-
sized community), an issue of barriers between more familiar and more public regimes 
of engagement often impedes direct communication. This crossing is something CSOs 
can facilitate as part of their mediator role. Apart from the need to be represented, it 
seems that more personal experiences are also increasingly called for in public debate 
(Thévenot 2007). Even so, involvement does not necessarily increase a sense of 
accountability. Occasionally experiences may be extracted and even commercialized as 
proof for agendas that might or might not be distant to the people lending their 
experiences. “Victims” of climate change may be left mute outside of the hegemonic 
structure and forms of representation (cf. Spivak 1988). 
It is widely proposed that civil society activity fundamentally boosts democracy (e.g. 
Putnam 1995). In India, it has been observed to contribute to a lively public sphere and 
deepen democracy also while challenging the government (Swain 1997). Fung (2003) 
strongly argues that civil society associations enhance democracy, but depending on the 
vision of democracy one is inclined to favor, the role of civil society is differentially 
emphasized. Simply stating that healthy civil society activity nurtures democracy can 
“hide more than it reveals”. (Ibid., 516–517, 529.) Attempting a more precise analysis, 
Fung (ibid., 518–529) identifies specific ways that ways that CSOs contribute to 
democracy. Out of the functions he defines, the watchdog role of civil society is 
important in the case of climate change involvement in India: checking governments for 
compliance with international agreements and monitoring that climate policies do not 
harm livelihoods. Essential are also the educational and public deliberation aspects 
discussed here along with awareness-raising activities. The intrinsic value of civil 
society activity is central as well, since collective action may help overcome gaps in the 
Indian society otherwise hard to overcome (Karan 1994). But the functions of 
representation and participation are debatable. As seen, in India, an important way for 
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CSOs to be involved is the advisory role. Simultaneously, those CSOs directly 
participating in the policy processes already pertain to the decision-making segment of 
society. Fung acknowledges CSOs’ direct participation as enhancing democracy, but in 
some cases its function is to address the capacity-deficits of authorities to solve public 
problems. It is difficult to draw a straightforward line between CSOs and democracy, as 
aspects of CSOs’ different actions effectuate in multiple ways. It should also be noted 
that universalistic concepts, such as civil society and democracy, carry their own 
specificities in distinct cultural backdrops. 
This study provides sociological insight on a theme often viewed through a state-
centered lens. It points out that the values at the heart of the climate change discussion 
might be conceived of fairly differently in distinct geographical, societal or institutional 
contexts. To conclude on a more general note on global climate politics, for 
international negotiations to succeed, a consensus approach is likely to be necessary. 
This requires not only governments’ negotiation but also civil society participation 
(Barker et al. 2008, 322). For global climate policy to be effective, it must be considered 
legitimate and fair by parties. This is why consensus will also probably require a 
“hybrid justice” solution (Parks & Roberts 2010, 151). Notions of India “hiding behind 
the poor” (Ananthapadmanabhan et al. 2007) or reluctant Northern superpowers “hiding 
behind India” (Dubash 2009, 10) convey an injustice reading of the situation on many 
sides. Dubash (2009, 15) highlights that while “India has to take the environment side 
of the story more seriously, Annex 1 countries will have to internalize and address the 
equity framing of the climate problem”. It is essential that equity be taken into account 
in the negotiations – otherwise there is slim chance of reaching agreement (Dubash 
2012b, 51; Goodman 2009, 511; Parks & Roberts 2010, 147; Urry 2011, 120). 
Justification-wise, such a hybrid justice would imply a compromise between 
understandings of the common good, and an expansion of criteria of worth. The reality 
of advancing climate change pertains to what Boltanski and Thévenot (1999, 374) call 
“ambiguous situations” (situations troublés). As a multifaceted problem by nature, 
climate change is particularly vulnerable to criticism by virtue of containing objects 
relevant in several worlds: “the less pure a situation is […] the easier it is to denounce 
it” (ibid.). Although compromises are unstable, they are probably the only way to reach 
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agreement when arguments are worlds apart. What is left to assess is whether grouping 
of justifications maintains explanatory power in such a setting. Boltanski and Thévenot 
consider their framework as a plurality of mutually exclusive modes of justification 
(ibid., 359). They assume that the possibility of dispute lies primarily in a scale of good, 
of right and wrong, to be employed; one which has a principled grounding but is 
harnessed to everyday use. Indeed, commonly acknowledge principles may provide a 
basis for action and discussion, but they seem to be employed in a complex way. Moral 
problems can be understood as a dispute within a world or as disagreement about which 
world to operate in. It seems that especially disputes that carry a global dimension entail 
more often than not overlaps between orders of worth. More radically, different actors 
might actually collectively approve of different sets of value scales altogether.  
Currents of globalization are also hybrid in the sense that governance structures are 
opening up to a heterogeneity of regimes of engagement. They extend to actors and 
experiences that are no directly connected to the public sphere. (Thévenot 2007, 420.) 
But the personal and the public are far from being equal in power and appeal in global 
climate politics. There is an evident need to operate in legitimate registers of speech and 
action, where certain speakers and actors are acknowledged as more competent than 
others due to their worthy characteristics. I have observed that within their work on 
climate change, CSOs can sometimes act as translators and mediators between regimes. 
These processes require further study, which would benefit from a composition based 
on field research in a setting more remote from the arenas of active climate politics. 
The interviews with fifteen CSO representatives provide an overview of what civil 
society actors do and say on climate change in India. It must be acknowledged anyhow 
that their views cannot be too readily generalized to the whole civil society of the vast 
country. One should be cautious in drawing conclusions for India, or Indian civil 
society, as a single entity (Jayal 2001). It should be kept in mind that the interviews 
were deliberately restricted to organizations with operations in New Delhi. However, 
one of the findings of the study is that climate politics are actually mainly the domain of 
transnationally networked organizations in metropolitan India. A detailed examination 
reveals that the number of CSOs in climate politics is relatively limited considering the 
size of the country, and all of the most important ones are in fact covered in the 
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material, resulting in a rather comprehensive outlook of the field. Besides inescapable 
limitations in the reach of an interview study, there are certain limits inherent to 
interview research as a method. The interview situation might be reflected in statements 
or affect the respondent’s tendency to agree or disagree, for instance according to the 
interviewer and their degree of insider capacity. The versatility of settings in this study 
reduces bias by making the data more many-sided. Also, the interview material 
constitutes an artificially constructed “debate”. It would be interesting to further study 
CSOs’ argumentation on climate change in an actual, dynamic dispute situation.  
Boltanski and Thévenot’s framework, based not only on French society, is formulated 
on the basis of a wide exploration of the history of Western political philosophy. While 
it has proved useful also when applied in geographical and thematic contexts outside 
Europe (Huikuri 2011; Koveneva 2011; Lamont & Thévenot 2000; Lonkila 2011; 
Thévenot 2011a), cultural limits may come along. Surely some scholars would deem 
my endeavor Euro-centric (cf. Bhambra 2007). I was constantly conscious of the threat 
of projecting a potentially culturally insensitive replicate of a Western sociological lens 
on a South Asian context. It would be fascinating to develop a theoretical framework on 
understandings of common good from within Indian philosophical traditions. India, a 
multi-voiced society rooted in a tradition of public debate (Sen 2007[2005]), hosts an 
array of its own political doctrines and ideologies that bear resemblance to but are 
nevertheless quite different from those in the West. Gandhi, for one, offered new forms 
of political action and ways of conceptualizing the relations between political 
opponents. (Chandhoke 2010; Parekh 2006, 455.) Future research could embark on the 
task of dissecting the preferred ways of representing engagement and the specific 
content of fundamental moral principles underlying political debate in India. Yet 
assuming from the outset that climate talk in India is so divergent that it cannot be 
conceptualized through the justification approach implies in itself an act of 
mystification. There appear to be intriguing differences between Indian and Northern 
CSOs in climate politics, but these should not be exaggerated, either. The justification 
framework captures these distinctions quite well and helps in understanding them. 
The thesis finds that urban Indian civil society actors concerned with climate change 
adopt an inspired justice approach to climate politics – an equity emphasis that draws 
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from domestic environmentalisms. On one hand, the CSOs often form part of 
international networks and rely on transnationally diffused concepts, as the global civil 
society also speaks of climate justice and food sovereignty, for instance. On the other 
hand, their environmentalism has a distinctive nuance: justice entangled with traditional 
conceptions of valuing nature. The actors occasionally articulate their views within a 
more technical planning discourse, which is fairly uniform in the global climate 
discussion and common also among international civil society actors. While this is often 
paralleled with arguments embracing market worth, CSOs in India quite consistently 
reject the internationally prevalent market talk. I have peaked into the way that globally 
influential moral practices of justification are merged and refined, “domesticated”, 
“reframed” or “aligned” in a local context (cf. Alasuutari 2009; Benford & Snow 2000; 
Della Porta & Diani 2006) and local normative conceptualizations in turn pushed 
through to higher political levels (cf. Okereke 2008; Parks & Roberts 2010). 
Theoretically this part of justification processes provides fertile ground for further 
research. 
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Appendix 1: List of abbreviations 
CAN(SA)  Climate Action Network South Asia 
CBDR “Common but differentiated responsibilities” 
CDM Clean Development Mechanism 
CMI Carbon Minus India 
CO2 Carbon dioxide 
COP Conference of Parties 
CSE Centre for Science and Environment 
CSO Civil society organization 
DA Development Alternatives 
ENGO Environmental non-governmental organization 
GHG Greenhouse gas 
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
IYCN India Youth Climate Network 
MoEF Ministry of Environment and Forest of India 
NAP(CC) National Action Plan on Climate Change 
NGDO  Non-governmental development organization 
NGO Non-governmental organization 
PAIRVI Public Advocacy Initiatives for Rights and Values in India 
SADED        South Asian Dialogues on Ecological Democracy 
TERI The Energy and Resources Institute 
UN  United Nations 
UNCED  United Nations Conference on Human Environment and Development 
 “Earth summit” (Rio de Janeiro, 1992) 
UNCHE United Nations Conference on the Human Environment 
 “Stockholm conference” (Stockholm, 1972) 
UNDP United Nations Development Programme 
(UN)FCCC  United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
WRI World Resources Institute 
WSSD World Summit on Sustainable Development 
 “Johannesburg summit” (Johannesburg, 2002) 
WWF World Wide Fund for Nature 
  
Appendix 2: Interview questions 
A. What do they do and how did they start 
1. What is your current position/role in your group, what do you do there exactly? 
(Briefly describe the structure of the organization, and what you yourself do 
within this structure.) 
2. What does your organization do related to climate change? 
3. When did you start working on climate change? 
4. What made your organization begin climate campaigning? 
5. Were some activities phased out to make way for climate change work? 
B. Climate change in the media 
1. Is climate a much-debated issue in the media in your country? Which points of 
view are the strongest in this media debate? 
2. Who are agenda-setters, the actors who most define how the climate debate 
proceeds in your country? 
3. Are your association’s own points of view heard in the public debate? 
4. What are the worst shortcomings of the public debate, what are the points of 
view that you would like to be treated in the media? 
 C. Networks: Who do they work with and whom do they influence   
1. Who are the five most central actors of climate politics/policy (organizations, 
firms, media, ministries…) from the viewpoint of your organization? 
Nationally/globally? (Persons and organizations) 
2. With whom do you co-operate in climate issues? On the local level? On the 
national level? On the global level? 
3. Does a local/national/global association network on climate issues exist, and/or 
are there competing networks/associations? How do these different levels of 
networks function, what do the different actors do (demonstrations, public 
debate, lobbying)? 
4. Can it be said that civil society in your country speaks with one voice on climate 
change, or are there diverging viewpoints? 
5. What kind of contacts do you have with decision-makers of climate policies 
locally, nationally, globally? 
6. Do you participate in consultations, advisory boards, or other forums/arenas 
organized by the administration that influence the climate negotiations or 
debates? 
  
7. Does it feel like it is possible to influence decision making in these instances? 
What has the network accomplished? 
8. Has the organization taken part in the international climate summits? How do 
you see the role of these summits in local/national/global climate politics? 
9. Which summit(s) – and which would you see as the most important one(s)? 
Your organization’s experience of 
 a. Preparing the summit(s), local/national/global level? 
 b. Participating in the summit(s)? 
 c. The results of the summit(s)? 
D. Climate justice – solutions and responsibilities 
1. Do you think countries have different responsibilities in solving the climate 
problem? Why? (If yes, does your country have a special role, does it have more 
or less responsibility than other countries? Does it have special abilities to act in 
this respect?) 
2. Is there a problem of justice or equity between different countries related to 
climate change? 
3. (If this did not come up): Is there a problem of justice between the rich and poor 
countries, or North and South? 
4. When I say climate justice, what’s your first thought? 
5. What about justice between individual people? 
6. Do you think the UN summit process will solve the problem of climate change 
eventually? 
7. What role do you see for international legislation in solving the problem? 
8. What role do you see for technology in solving the problem? 
9. What role for civil society in solving the problem? 
10. What role do you see for consumers in solving the problem? 
11. What role for businesses? 
12. What about carbon markets? 
E. Wrap-up 
1. What would you change in the climate policy in your country and at the global 
level? What are the aims of your advocacy work in this respect? 
2. What motivates you – why, for you personally, is the fight against climate 
change important? (Justifications encore une fois) 
